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I. INTRODUCTION
Few international institutions have elicited greater expec-
tations or deeper suspicions than the International Criminal
Court (ICC or “Court”).  Mandated by a multilateral treaty, the
so-called Rome Statute, to prosecute and punish persons ac-
cused of serious international crimes,1 the ICC represents the
latest chapter in the evolution of an international legal order
once concerned primarily with the mutual relations of states
but now increasingly focused on the rights and obligations of
individuals.  In the eight years since the Rome Statute’s adop-
tion, one hundred and four nations representing each inhab-
ited continent have become “States Parties” to the treaty.  An
additional thirty-five countries have signed the treaty without
ratifying it.  In a separate category stands the United States,
which, under the Clinton administration, voted against the
Rome Statute’s adoption in July 1998, then signed the treaty;2
and then, under the Bush administration, announced that it
would not become a party.3  The U.S. government has since
taken vigorous actions to oppose the ICC and to preempt any
scenario that might focus the Court’s investigative and
prosecutorial powers on U.S. soldiers or officials.4  At the same
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
2. See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs Treaty for World Court to Try Atrocities,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A1.
3. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, International Criminal
Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm; see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 21 (2d. ed. 2004).
4. In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Servicemembers’
Protection Act which, subject to various presidential waivers, prohibits the
United States from providing military assistance to any party to the Rome
Statute. See American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), Pub.
L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899.  The United States has also entered into over
ninety bilateral “Article 98” agreements with various states prohibiting the
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time, the United States, along with fellow nonratifiers Russia
and China, remains a participant in the ICC by virtue of its
permanent, veto-wielding seat on the U.N. Security Council,
whose mandate to protect international peace and security is
specifically recognized by a Rome Statute provision allowing
the Council to refer situations to the Court that would other-
wise be outside the Court’s jurisdiction.5  In that capacity, the
United States recently decided (by abstaining from the vote
rather than exercising its veto) to allow ICC investigations of
war crimes in the Darfur area of Sudan, a nonparty to the
Rome Statute.6
The ICC has proven controversial to say the least.  And no
aspect of the Court’s institutional architecture has provoked
more controversy—or proven more central to the United
States’ opposition—than has the provision for a standing inde-
pendent prosecutor authorized to initiate investigations and
indictments subject primarily to judicial, rather than political,
constraints.  The conception of the prosecutor provoked bitter
debate during the negotiation of the Rome Statute, with the
United States demanding that the prosecutorial function be
dependent always upon the U.N. Security Council’s decision
to trigger investigation of any “situation” of alleged crimes.
The defeat of that proposal in favor of a more indepen-
dent prosecutor may have ended one debate, but it has failed
to resolve the more profound question of how the ICC Prose-
cutor should and will employ the authority afforded by the
Rome Statute.  While not entirely unrestrained, the ICC Prose-
cutor remains the most crucial arbiter of where, and against
whom, the ICC directs its efforts.  Just as important, the Prose-
cutor will largely decide when to restrain the powers of the
surrender of U.S. citizens to the ICC. See Frederic L. Kirgis, U.S. Drops Plan to
Exempt G.I.’s from U.N. Court, ASIL INSIGHTS, (July 2004), http://
www.asil.org/insights/insigh139.htm; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98.
After threatening to withdraw its support for U.N. peacekeeping missions
across the globe, the United States has twice, in 2002 and 2003, passed Se-
curity Council resolutions prohibiting any ICC investigations of U.N.
peacekeepers for a one-year period.  S.C. Res. 1422 ¶  1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1422 (July 12, 2002);  S.C. Res. 1487, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12,
2003).  The United States failed to secure a similar resolution in 2004.
5. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
6. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C.
Meeting Record, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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Court.  These decisions will fundamentally define the Court’s
role and purpose.
To date, the debate over the ICC Prosecutor has tracked
familiar lines that largely replicate those which divided the
treaty’s drafters.  To the Court’s supporters it remains clear
that, as a legal institution administering a legal process, the
Court must be guided by legal criteria and remain impervious
to outside political pressures.  To the extent that prosecutorial
discretion is even perceived as a problem, the problem is one
of legality:  When existing legal rules do not determine whom
to investigate and indict, either the Prosecutor must develop
ex ante guidelines that have the quality of law, or the Court’s
judges must direct or guide the Prosecutor through their in-
terpretation of the Rome Statute.7  Although this account has
some appeal, its plausibility depends on the adequacy of its
underlying assumptions.  The negative refrain against
“politicizing” the ICC presupposes a positive model of
prosecutorial discretion that furthers the Court’s institutional
goals without recourse to political considerations.  A problem
arises, however, if this account of the ICC’s work is insufficient,
if indeed the “legitimacy” of the ICC depends on determina-
tions that are sensitive to contingent political criteria in ways
not susceptible to bright-line or politically neutral rules.  In
that event, the emphasis on formal or procedural legitimacy
may come at the cost of public perceptions of legitimacy, fo-
cused not on the procedural neutrality of the Court’s inner
workings but instead on the outcome of the Court’s work for
societies that have experienced war crimes.
The competing account, advanced primarily by the U.S.
government and American political conservatives, also adheres
by and large to the ideal of an apolitical court and continues
7. Avril McDonald & Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial Discretion – Some
Thoughts on ‘Objectifying’ the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion by the Prosecutor of
the ICC, Apr. 15, 2003, ICC-OTP, at 2, http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/consulta-
tions.php; Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountabil-
ity of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L.
L. 510 (2003); He´ctor Ola´solo, The prosecutor of the ICC before the initiation of
investigations: A quasi-judicial or a political body? 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 87
(2003); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning
Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293 (2005); Dar-
ryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions, and
the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481 (2003).
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to focus on the alleged illegitimacy of unrestrained and unac-
countable prosecutors.8  Drawing in part on the United States’
experience under its now lapsed Independent Counsel Act,
these critics argue that the ICC lacks sufficient political safe-
guards to protect against the abuse of prosecutorial authority.9
Those who advance this position also sometimes point to the
inherently political nature of the ICC’s work as an additional
shortcoming.10  In this view, prosecutorial discretion is not a
problem to be solved but a reason to reject and oppose the
Court wholesale.
Thus focused on problems of legality and accountability,
the existing debate over prosecutorial authority has offered a
limited, and ultimately unsatisfying, perspective on the
problems of international criminal justice.  This Article seeks
to remedy that deficit in two ways.  First, I provide a fuller,
more considered account than currently exists in the literature
of why prosecutorial discretion is such a troubling challenge
for the ICC.  Consistent with the view that the Prosecutor’s
function is broadly “political,” I argue that the very structure of
the ICC—with its framework of prosecutorial independence
and mandatory deference to “complementary” national pro-
8. See, e.g., Marc Grossman, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, Remarks to
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC (May 6,
2002), http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/9949.htm; Lee A. Casey et al., The
United States and the International Criminal Court: Concerns and Possible
Courses of Action (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/
White%20Papers/nationalsecurity.htm.
9. See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1633, 1644-51 (2003) (describing this view and arguing that the ICC Prose-
cutor must be distinguished from the Independent Counsel).  The Indepen-
dent Counsel Act provided for the judicial appointment and supervision
(with only limited involvement of the U.S. Attorney General) of indepen-
dent counsel to investigate alleged federal crimes committed by senior gov-
ernment officials.  In his famous dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion upholding the Act in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Antonin Scalia expressed
the fear that the framework would allow prosecutors to pursue politically
motivated agendas with “no one accountable to the public to whom the
blame could be assigned.”  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and
International Security, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002), http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm.
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ceedings—will impose difficult policy dilemmas on even the
most well-meaning and politically detached Prosecutor.  Thus
complicating purely legalistic accounts of the Court’s mission,
the current structure of the ICC violates the very standards of
legitimacy that the Court’s founders and supporters invoke to
justify its existence.  More than any argument offered at the
Rome Conference, this fundamental instability calls into ques-
tion the viability of an international criminal enforcement re-
gime rooted in the Rome Statute’s high level of prosecutorial
independence.
Second, although there are no ready means to eliminate
this instability, I argue that a deeper understanding of the
prosecutorial function and its relationship to the ICC’s
broader mission suggests that internal prosecutorial policy
can—and most likely will—moderate the problem.  Here, I
agree in part with those ICC supporters who seek legitimacy
through rules, although the mere existence of objective guide-
lines or judicial interpretation is no panacea.  Rather, a suc-
cessful prosecutorial policy must come to terms with the ten-
sion between the demand for prosecutorial independence and
the legitimacy challenge posed by the substantive dilemmas of
prosecutorial discretion.  In this Article, I propose a pragmatic
model of prosecutorial discretion that seeks, to the extent pos-
sible, to satisfy both conditions and to reconcile the concerns
of the Court’s supporters and detractors.
My discussion divides into five parts.  Part One provides a
brief introduction to the ICC.  It offers an overview of the
Rome Conference debate on prosecutorial authority, the most
relevant terms of the treaty, and subsequent developments.
Part Two situates the problem of prosecutorial discretion
within the context of the ICC’s institutional structure and mis-
sion.  Defining contextual factors include the Court’s aspira-
tion to catalyze social and political change in war-torn socie-
ties, the limited political contexts in which the Court’s histori-
cal predecessors have employed international criminal law to
pursue these goals, and the extreme resource limitations that
emphasize the symbolic, tokenistic methods of international
criminal tribunals.
Part Three considers five discretionary dilemmas that
complicate the work of the ICC Prosecutor.  I begin with the
well-worn but nonetheless still-pressing debate on whether war
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crimes prosecutions should ever defer to nonprosecutorial al-
ternatives such as amnesty processes, and then I consider how,
far from representing a special or unique case, the considera-
tions underlying the amnesty debate pervade prosecutorial
decisionmaking even in cases where the criminal justice system
is applied.  What emerges is less a clear choice between am-
nesty and prosecution than a continuum of solutions faced by
societies which have experienced the pervasive commission of
terrible crimes.  This Part also considers related questions in-
volving the timing of indictments, the gravity of crimes investi-
gated, and the challenges posed by investigations of multilat-
eral offenders.
Part Four looks at existing proposals to justify or correct
the Rome Statute’s system of prosecutorial authority through
ex ante prosecutorial guidelines or judicial construction of the
Rome Statute.  I consider the benefits and drawbacks of each
approach and argue that neither adequately resolves the ICC’s
legitimacy crisis.
In Part Five, I develop an alternate framework for
prosecutorial authority, which I term the “political deference
model.”  According to this model, the Prosecutor can honor
the Rome Statute’s normative goals by taking vigorous action
during times of ongoing conflict to investigate high-level per-
petrators of morally unambiguous crimes whose prosecution
should presumptively draw broad political consensus.  By
launching investigations and indictments before a political set-
tlement has been reached, the Prosecutor may play a key sym-
bolic role by drawing attention to international crimes and,
one hopes, by encouraging international political actors to as-
sign greater weight to the concerns of international justice
even if actual arrests and trials remain infeasible.
However, the Prosecutor’s own charging policies should
be prepared to give way to the judgments of legitimate politi-
cal actors in times of political transition when actual arrests are
more likely and competing justice proposals pose a more
troubling challenge to the ICC’s authority.  In that scenario, I
argue that the Prosecutor should encourage legitimate politi-
cal actors to reach policy decisions that will command defer-
ence by the ICC.  Such deference could take one or both of
the following forms:  (1) explicit deference to political actors,
principally the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, and (2) implied or constructive defer-
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ence undertaken through a minimalist focus on only the most
severe offenders of the most offensive and morally unambigu-
ous crimes.  To some extent these two options mirror the di-
vide between the Court’s detractors and supporters, but the
options are not mutually exclusive, and each, I believe, has the
potential to bridge that divide.  Although explicit deference
may best engage the ICC in a productive international regime
of transitional justice, the Court’s Prosecutor has publicly en-
dorsed an approach that more closely follows the path of con-
structive deference.  If so, this Article provides a framework for
understanding that strategy and supplies it with a rationale—
one based on unresolved policy dilemmas rather than mere
resource constraints—that is superior to that which the ICC
Prosecutor has publicly invoked.
II. BACKGROUND:  THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ICC
A. The Debate at the Rome Conference
The project of the ICC dates from the conclusion of
World War II, when the Allied Powers created International
Military Tribunals (IMTs) to try individual senior German and
Japanese officials for crimes committed under international
law.11  Calls for the establishment of a permanent standing tri-
bunal would have to wait until the end of the Cold War, how-
ever, when the U.N. Security Council’s creation of ad hoc
criminal tribunals to try perpetrators of atrocities in the for-
mer Yugoslavia and Rwanda renewed the global commitment
to international criminal justice.  Efforts organized by the U.N.
General Assembly ultimately led to the United Nations Diplo-
matic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court (the Rome Conference), held
in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998, at which delegates
11. On the history of the IMTs, see generally GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY
THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS (2000); AR-
NOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TO-
KYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987); PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN
STORY (2001); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
(1992); RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS’ JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL
(1971); THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (George Ginsburgs
& V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL (1983).
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from over 160 states negotiated and approved the final text of
the Rome Statute.12
The question of prosecutorial authority proved a major
point of dispute throughout the process.  A 1994 draft statute
developed by the U.N.’s International Law Commission fore-
saw that investigations would generally commence upon refer-
ral by either the U.N. Security Council or a State Party that
held a suspect in custody or whose territory was the locus of
the alleged crime.13  At the Rome Conference, however, pro-
posals for a more independent Prosecutor and an expanded
system of state referrals14 received critical support from an or-
ganized group of sixty-three “like-minded” states that played
the key role in deciding the terms of the final statute.15
Although the like-minded agenda doubtless reflected
some resentment over the disproportionate political power en-
joyed by the five veto-wielding permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council,16 the public rationale for enhanced
12. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 15-19. R
13. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, arts. 21, 23 (1994),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/
7_4_1994.pdf.  The draft allowed one exception to this rule:  In cases of ge-
nocide, any party to the Genocide Convention could lodge a complaint
which might form the basis of a genocide investigation. Id. art. 25(1).
14. See Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of International Criminal Court, June 15 - July 17, 1998, Draft Statute of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art.
11, 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (1998) [hereinafter “Final PrepCom
Draft Statute”].
15. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 15-16, 16 n.54.  Of the Security Council’s R
permanent members, only the United Kingdom joined the like-minded
group. Id. at 16 n.54.  France, however, would later ratify the Statute as well.
See id. at 159 n.43.  Schabas identifies the full list of like-minded states at 16
n.54.
16. See U.N. Charter art. 23 para. 1 (designating Republic of China,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America as
permanent Security Council members; Russia has since been recognized as
the legal successor to the Soviet Union’s membership). See Ruth Wedgwood,
Comment, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 20 (1998) (arguing that developing countries’ “new jealousy of
the Security Council’s exclusive authority over international security mat-
ters” and “the recent failed attempt of middle-rank powers to expand the
Council . . . . [m]ade it impossible for the United States to preserve an Amer-
ican veto over prosecution decisions by using the requirement of Council
approval.”)
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prosecutorial authority was that prosecutorial independence
was an essential requirement of a legitimate criminal court.  As
the Ad Hoc Committee’s report had noted, those states favor-
ing a stronger Prosecutor argued that mandatory Security
Council referral “would reduce the credibility and moral au-
thority of the court, excessively limit its role, [and] introduce
an inappropriate political influence over the functioning of
the institution.”17  This position received strong support from
representatives of nongovernmental organizations who en-
joyed unprecedented access to the proceedings and played an
instrumental role in setting the agenda of the like-minded
states.18  For example, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights urged the “imperative” that the Court’s exercise of juris-
diction be “bound by legal considerations only if the Court is to
play a meaningful role in the prevention and punishment of
genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious violations
of international humanitarian law.”19  Amnesty International
similarly argued that because the Court is “a judicial body . . .
its Prosecutor must have the independence to decide whether
to investigate or prosecute.”20
The United States favored a very different Court whose
powers would be almost entirely dependent upon Security
Council referrals,21 but it did not dispute the basic ideal of an
17. U.N. GAOR, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995).
18. See William R. Pace & Mark Thieroff, Participation of Non-Governmental
Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 392-93 (Roy S. Lee, ed. 1999)
(noting that “[m]any governments, the Secretary-General, other United Na-
tions officials and media experts have commented on the decisive role of
NGOs at the Rome Conference”); SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 15, 15 n.53. R
19. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF AN
EX OFFICIO PROSECUTOR 6 (1998).
20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MAK-
ING THE RIGHT CHOICES – PART 1 108-109 (Jan. 1997), http://web.amnesty.
org/library/pdf/IOR400011997ENGLISH/$File/IOR4000197.pdf. Both the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (since renamed Human Rights First)
and Amnesty International have been singled out as belonging to a group of
particularly influential NGOs who became engaged early on in the delibera-
tions over the ICC. See Pace & Thieroff, supra note 18, at 391. R
21. Although the United States was prepared to agree to referrals by
States Parties as well, it insisted upon a “require[ment] that if a State Party
referred a situation to the Court and that situation already was the object of
Security Council deliberations, then the Security Council’s approval would
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apolitical body.  It cautioned instead that a self-initiating Pros-
ecutor would “encourage overwhelming the court with com-
plaints and risk diversion of its resources, as well as embroil
the court in controversy, political decision-making, and confu-
sion.”22  In this respect, the debate at the Rome Conference
reflected at least a rhetorical consensus that war crimes prose-
cutions should be dictated by legal criteria rather than
clouded by “political decision-making.”23
B. The Rome Statute
The outcome of the Rome Conference is reflected in the
Rome Statute, which provides for the establishment of an In-
ternational Criminal Court sitting in The Hague, Netherlands
and charged with “exercis[ing] its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred
to in this Statute.”24  Through membership in an “Assembly of
States Parties,” the treaty members appoint by majority vote
the Court’s senior officials, including its Prosecutor, who
heads the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) for a maximum
nonrenewable term of nine years, and its eighteen judges, who
serve nine-year terms and are divided among an Appeals
Chamber, Trial Chambers, and Pre-Trial Chamber.25  The
be required before the matter could be taken up by the ICC.”  David Schef-
fer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Address at American Uni-
versity, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.state.gov/www/pol-
icy_remarks/2000/000914_scheffer_au.html.  This exception would have ef-
fectively vitiated the significance of including an independent state referral
process.
22. See Statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War
Crimes Issues And Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Con-
ference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23,
1998).  One diplomat who participated in the Rome Conference recalls that
“[t]hose who argued against granting proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor
feared an overzealous or politically motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly
or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations.”  Silvia A. Ferna´ndez de
Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RE-
SULTS, supra note 18, at 181.
23. Id. at 178 (“Both supporters and opponents of an independent Prose-
cutor feared the risks of politicization of the Court which, both sides agreed,
would undermine the impartiality and independence of the Court.”).
24. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3. R
25. Id. arts. 34-52.
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Prosecutor may be removed from office by a majority vote of
the Assembly of States Parties only for “serious misconduct,”
“serious breach of duties,” or “[inability] to exercise the func-
tions required by the Statute.”26  The criteria for the removal
of judges are the same, but removal requires a two-thirds ma-
jority vote.27
The ICC has jurisdiction over three categories of crimes:
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.28  The ele-
ments of genocide, reproduced verbatim from the Genocide
Convention, comprise any of five enumerated acts when com-
mitted “with intent to destroy, in part or in whole, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.”29  Crimes against
humanity are defined as a broader set of enumerated acts
committed as “part of a widespread attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”30  The Stat-
ute defines “war crimes” as “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949” and “[o]ther serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflicts, within the established framework of interna-
tional law,” both of which are further defined in the Statute.31
The Statute also provides for prosecution of the crime of ag-
gression, if and when the States Parties agree by majority vote
to amend the Statute to define the crime.  This issue deeply
divided the delegates to the Rome Conference and agreement
on a definition for aggression remains elusive.32
Cases come before the ICC in one of three ways.  The
U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.
26. Id. art. 46.
27. Id.
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. art 6; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
[hereinafter Genocide Convention].  I have previously written on some of
the ambiguities of this definition. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Re-
thinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Standard, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2259 (1999).
30. Id. Art 7.  The definition of crimes against humanity has undergone
substantial evolution since it was first codified for purposes of the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo tribunals.  On the evolution of the crime’s definition see
generally Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolv-
ing the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 787 (1999).
31. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. R
32. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 26-27. R
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Charter, may refer to the Prosecutor a “situation” in which
“one or more of such crimes [within the jurisdiction of the
Court] appears to have been committed.”33  Alternately, a
State Party may refer such a “situation” to the Prosecutor.34
Finally, the Prosecutor may commence an investigation inde-
pendently, or “proprio motu,” after  concluding there is a “rea-
sonable basis to proceed” and provided the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, acting upon the Prosecutor’s submission, authorizes the
investigation.35  In both State Party referrals and Prosecutor-
initiated investigations, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to
crimes committed on the territory of or by a national of a state
that is either a party to the treaty or that has specifically con-
sented to the Court’s jurisdiction over the specific crime in
question.36  No such limitation applies with respect to Security
Council referrals.37
Even when the Court has jurisdiction over a crime, it may
not entertain a case unless the case is “admissible.”  It is here
that the Rome Statute sets forth its so-called “complementar-
ity” regime, requiring deference to genuine state investiga-
tions and prosecutions.  A case “being investigated or prose-
cuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” is inadmissible
“unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution.”38  The result is similar when
a state has investigated a case over which it has jurisdiction,
“and has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.”39
In that event, the case is inadmissible “unless the decision re-
sulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genu-
inely to prosecute.”40  And in cases of double jeopardy where a
“person has already been tried for conduct which is the subject
of a complaint,” the case is inadmissible unless the proceed-
ings in the other court “[w]ere for the purpose of shielding
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court” or “[o]therwise were not
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
34. Id. arts. 13(a), 14.
35. Id. arts. 13(c), 15.
36. Id. art 12.
37. Id. (specifying territorial and nationality preconditions to jurisdiction
only with respect to prosecutions arising under articles 13(a) & (c)).
38. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
39. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
40. Id.
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conducted independently or impartially in accordance with
the norms of due process recognized by international law . . .
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances,
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice.”41
The Statute also creates an independent ground of inad-
missibility in cases where “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity
to justify further action by the Court.”42
The Prosecutor is required to undertake investigations
unless “there is no reasonable basis to proceed.”43  To make
this determination, the Prosecutor must consider whether
“[t]he information available to the Prosecutor provides a rea-
sonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court has been or is being committed,” and whether
“[t]he case is or would be admissible.”44  In addition, the Pros-
ecutor must consider whether “[t]aking into account the grav-
ity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonethe-
less substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice.”45  If the Prosecutor decides
solely on the latter ground not to investigate a case, that deci-
sion must be reported to the Pre-Trial Chamber.46
The same set of considerations apply after investigation,
when the Prosecutor must assess whether there is a basis for
prosecution.  The enumerated bases for declining prosection
include lack of jurisdiction, the inadmissibility of the case, or
the opinion that “[a] prosecution is not in the interests of jus-
tice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the
gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or
infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the
alleged crime.”47  In all cases where the Prosecutor declines to
prosecute after investigation, the decision must be reported
41. Id. arts. 17(1)(c), 20 (3).
42. Id. art. 17(1)(d).
43. Id. art. 53(1).
44. Id. art. 53(1)(a)-(b).
45. Id. art. 53(1)(c).  This phrasing is an odd fit with the remainder of
article 53.  Read literally, it suggests the logical contradiction that “there is
no reasonable basis to proceed” if “there are substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”
46. Id. art. 53.
47. Id. art. 53(2).
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and explained to the Pre-Trial Chamber and, if applicable, to
the referring State Party or U.N. Security Council.
Where the U.N. Security Council or State Party has re-
ferred a case to the Prosecutor, the referring body may ask the
Pre-Trial Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to
investigate or prosecute a case and the Pre-Trial Chamber
may, at its discretion, ask the Prosecutor to reconsider the de-
cision.48  If the decision not to proceed rests solely on the “in-
terests of justice,” the Pre-Trial Chamber may also review the
Prosecutor’s decision on its own motion.  The Statute provides
that “[i]n such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be
effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”49
The Prosecutor’s affirmative decision to proceed with in-
vestigation or prosecution is also subject to judicial review.
With respect to self-initiated prosecution and state referrals,
the Prosecutor must give notice to all States Parties as well as
to all states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
matter.  A state that has jurisdiction over persons potentially
subject to the investigation may then give notice that it is inves-
tigating or prosecuting such persons, after which the Prosecu-
tor cannot proceed without authorization from the Pre-Trial
Chamber.50
In all cases, the Prosecutor must apply to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for a warrant of arrest against a particular suspect
(which States Parties are required to enforce) or a summons
to appear.51  Once a suspect is arrested or voluntarily appears
before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber will hold a hearing to
confirm the charges.  Each accused party, state with jurisdic-
tion over a case, and nonparty state whose consent may be re-
quired to establish jurisdiction may challenge the admissibility
of a particular case.  This challenge will come before the Pre-
Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber depending upon whether
the charges have already been confirmed, and the Court’s de-
cision is subject to interlocutory appeal.  In the event that the
Court declares a case inadmissible, the Prosecutor may later
seek review of that decision based on new facts.52  More gener-
48. Id. art. 53(3)(a).
49. Id. art. 53(3)(b).
50. Id. art. 18(2).
51. Id. arts. 58-60.
52. Id. art. 19(10).
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ally, the Prosecutor is authorized at any time “to reconsider a
decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution
based on new facts or information.”53
The Rome Statute also provides a number of additional
provisions which I do not consider here, including those regu-
lating the arrest, extradition, trial, and sentencing of sus-
pects.54
C. Subsequent Developments
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, after
receiving ratifications from the requisite sixty States Parties.55
The Assembly of States Parties has since elected judges to the
Court and appointed as the Court’s first Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, a highly respected lawyer from Argentina
who previously prosecuted top leaders of a military junta re-
sponsible for disappearances in his home country.56  The OTP
has subsequently commenced investigations into three situa-
tions of alleged crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.  Two of
these, in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have
come at the referral of the State Party within whose borders
the allegations are focused.57  The Uganda investigation has
since yielded five arrest warrants but no arrests, while the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo investigation has led to charges
against one suspect currently within the Court’s custody.58
53. Id. art 53(4).
54. See, e.g., id. arts. 55-128.
55. See Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court Treaty Enters Into
Force, ASIL INSIGHTS  (April 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/.
56. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Election of the Prose-
cutor (April 23, 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/52.html.
57. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of Uganda
Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) to the ICC
(Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/16.html; Press
Release, International Criminal Court, Communications Received by the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor of the ICC (July 16, 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
press/pressreleases/67.html.  A third referral, from the Central African Re-
public, has yet to yield a decision whether or not to pursue investigation. See
Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral
Concerning Central African Republic (Jan. 7, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html.
58. For the Uganda arrest warrants, see International Criminal Court,
Request for Arrest and Surrender of Joseph Kony Issued on July 8, 2005 as
Amended on Sept. 27, 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105.html; International Criminal
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The third investigation commenced after the U.N. Security
Council acted under Chapter VII to refer allegations of war
crimes committed in the Sudan, which remains a nonparty to
the treaty.59  No charges so far have resulted from that investi-
gation.  Nor has Moreno-Ocampo commenced an investiga-
tion on his own authority.
III. THE CONTEXT OF DISCRETION
Questions of prosecutorial discretion, of course, are not
unique to the International Criminal Court.  The structure of
prosecutorial authority set forth in the Rome Statute closely
resembles that typical of traditional common law systems, in
which prosecutors, subject to varying degrees of judicial super-
vision, enjoy the primary authority to select and pursue crimi-
nal cases.
Consider the example of the United States, in which the
vast majority of criminal cases never reach trial.  Prosecutors
dispose of such cases either by deciding not to prosecute the
guilty party or by negotiating a plea bargain that rewards a co-
operative defendant with a lower sentence or punishment for
a lesser offense than would otherwise have been charged.  The
literature and case law on prosecutorial discretion has focused
on such motivating concerns as the need to promote essential
government policies and priorities in the face of resource con-
straints, the need to ensure that justice is achieved in individ-
ual cases, and the need to respect fairness and equality by
Court, Request for Arrest and Surrender of Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04
(July 8, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105.html;
International Criminal Court, Request for Arrest and Surrender of Okot
Odhiambo, ICC-02/04 (July 8, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
cases/UGD/c0105.html; International Criminal Court, Request for Arrest
and Surrender of Raska Lukwiya, ICC-02/04 (July 8, 2005), available at http:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105.html; International Criminal Court, Re-
quest for Arrest and Surrender of Vincent Otti, ICC-02/04 (July 8, 2005),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105.html [hereinafter
Uganda Arrest Warrants].  For the Democratic Republic of Congo arrest and
warrant, see Press Release, International Criminal Court, First Arrest for the
International Criminal Court (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=132.html; International Criminal Court, Sit-
uation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06 (Feb. 10,
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/RDC.html.
59. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6, U.N. oc s/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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treating like cases alike.60  To guide prosecutorial decision-
making, executive officials such as state or federal attorneys
general or chief prosecutors of particular local jurisdictions
promulgate prosecutorial guidelines designed to direct and
regularize prosecutorial authority according to specific poli-
cies.61  The situation is more complex in civil law countries,
which have traditionally rejected the notion of prosecutorial
discretion in favor of a judge-controlled system characterized
by a “duty” to prosecute and by judicial administration of in-
vestigations, charging decisions, and trials.  A longstanding de-
bate among scholars has questioned whether the actual prac-
tice of civil law states reflects more commonalties with com-
mon law systems than formally are recognized, and legislative
reforms in civil law states have further blurred the distinc-
tion.62
If the debate over the ICC Prosecutor were concerned
merely with those questions typically confronted in the domes-
tic context, there might be little reason to afford the ICC spe-
cial attention.  However, the policy dilemmas facing the ICC
Prosecutor are heavily determined by institutional goals and
limitations that fundamentally distinguish international prose-
cution from its domestic counterpart.  I consider below some
60. For recent discussion of these issues, see, e.g., Bruce A. Green and
Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837 (2004); Peter
Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 650-56
(2002) (summarizing primary models of prosecutorial guidelines); Gerald E.
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2136-41 (1998) (discussing justifications for prosecutorial discretion includ-
ing resource constraints); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and
the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-34 (1997) (critiquing
common rationales for prosecutorial discretion).
61. See, e.g., Krug, supra note 60, at 650-52. R
62. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice
as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions? 18 B.C.
INT’L & COMP L. REV. 317 (1995); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Jus-
tice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We
Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 610-25 (1990); Wil-
liam T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Lim-
its of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325 (1993); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 Yale L. J. 1549 (1978); Abraham S. Goldstein
& Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” Sys-
tems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L. J. 240 (1977).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\39-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-MAR-07 11:17
2007] JUSTICE WITHOUT POLITICS? 601
key contextual considerations that frame the ICC Prosecutor’s
work.
A. Goals
The Rome Statute itself does not explore prosecutorial
goals in any substantial detail.  Lumping the Court’s rationale
together under the single heading of crime prevention, the
Statute’s preamble notes its signatories’ “mindful[ness] that
during this century millions of children, women, and men
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity,” and their “recogni[tion] that
such grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and well-being
of the world.”  It then expresses the States Parties’
“determin[ation] to put an end to impunity for the perpetra-
tors of these crimes and thus to prevent such crimes.”63  The
goal of crime prevention is of course a laudable one and,
phrased at that level of generality, offers a rationale for the
ICC that few could dispute.  But precisely how is the ICC ex-
pected to prevent crime?  And does crime prevention alone
provide a satisfactory account of the ICC’s aspirations?
1. Political Aspirations
Standard utilitarian rationales for punishment such as in-
capacitation, deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation all
aim, in one or way or another, to prevent crime.64  Although
supporters of international criminal tribunals may be said to
embrace versions of these goals, their focus is a form of pre-
vention simultaneously broader and more specific than that
contemplated by the standard theories:  namely, the aspiration
that international criminal tribunals can effect positive politi-
cal change in the societies most affected by the commission of
war crimes.  This “political” aspiration operates in different
ways.  In some permutations prosecution and punishment
aims directly to impact political or military governance
through incapacitation and a kind of specific deterrence.65  In-
63. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added). R
64. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 60-61 (Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore & Ste-
phen J. Morse, eds., 1999).
65. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001).  In this context, I
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carceration may remove evil political actors from power, and
those who remain at large may go into hiding from where they
have less influence, or they may otherwise temper their behav-
ior.  Perhaps the most central goal, however, is that trials will
serve as tools of social engineering by catalyzing society-wide
transformations that eliminate the underlying social and politi-
cal causes that have facilitated the commission of international
crimes.  Advocates hope that by exposing the truth about
atrocities, subjecting a select group of perpetrators to highly
public criminal trials whose procedures reflect fair and impar-
tial process, and providing some measure of justice to victims
while emphasizing individual over collective responsibility,
tribunals will help break cycles of violence, delegitimize crimi-
nal regimes, and promote transitions to peaceful liberal socie-
ties rooted in the rule of law.66
These lofty ideals pervade the history of international
criminal tribunals, beginning with the Nuremberg trials fol-
lowing World War II, in which a tribunal consisting of judges
and prosecutors appointed by the Allied Powers tried and con-
use the term specific deterrence to refer to the potential for national deter-
rence in the specific societies in which investigations are focused—whether
the object of the deterrence is a past or prospective war criminal.  That ratio-
nale may be distinguished from a kind of general international deterrence
which hopes that war crimes prosecutions in some states will affect the be-
havior of individuals in other states. See infra Part II.A.2.
66. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment,
96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 (1998) (distilling the “goals most frequently
articulated by the diplomats who established these tribunals and the relevant
epistemic community of international lawyers,” including these goals:  to
“channel victims’ thirst for revenge toward peaceful dispute resolution,” “tell
the truth about what occurred, thereby preserving an accurate historical ac-
count of barbarism that would help prevent its recurrence,” and “perhaps
most importantly, restore the lost civility of torn societies to achieve national
reconciliation.”); Akhavan, supra note 65 (evaluating the impact of interna- R
tional criminal justice on postconflict peace building); Richard J. Goldstone
& Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 53 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds.,
2000) (“The denial of atrocity is closely linked to the committing of atroc-
ity . . . .  After a war, distorted memories can lay the groundwork for a fresh
outbreak of violence.”); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28 (2000)
(“Why punish?  The leading argument for punishment in periods of political
flux is consequentialist and forward-looking:  It is contended that, in socie-
ties with evil legacies moving out of repressive rule, successor trials play a
significant foundational role in laying the basis of a new liberal order.”).
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victed twenty-four high-ranking German officials.  A critical
champion of the effort to pursue fair trials rather than sum-
mary execution,67 U.S. War Department Secretary Henry Stim-
son saw Nuremberg as a crucial building block of a future
peace in Europe based on a stable, rehabilitated Germany.
“We should always have in mind,” he argued, “the necessity of
punishing effectively enough to bring home to the German
people the wrongdoing done in their name, and thus prevent
similar conduct in the future, without depriving them of the
hope of a future respected Germany community.”68  The Al-
lies’ endorsement of this approach represented a critical vic-
tory for those who, like Stimson, believed that “[a] transition
to peace without vengeance would provide a stable foundation
for the postwar world.”69
In his famous opening speech at the commencement of
the Nuremberg trials, U.S. Supreme Court Justice and Nurem-
berg Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson highlighted the sym-
bolic ambitions of the proceedings.  Observing that the indi-
vidual fate of the “twenty-odd broken men” sitting in the pris-
oners’ dock was “of little consequence to the world,” Jackson
emphasized that the purpose of the proceedings was not sim-
ply to prove the individual criminal guilt of the defendants,
but instead to reveal the accused as “living symbols” of “fierce
nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making
which have embroiled Europe generation after generation,
crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverish-
ing its life.”70  Echoing Stimson’s concern for the rehabilita-
tion of German society, Jackson further emphasized that there
67. At one point both Churchill and Stalin favored summary execution
for Nazi leaders, as did U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who fur-
ther advocated the deindustrialization of the German state into one “prima-
rily agricultural and pastoral in nature,” quoted in MAGUIRE, supra note 11, at R
88 (2001).
68. BASS, supra note 11, at 157. R
69. MAGUIRE, supra note 11, at 90-91.  Stimson argued that summary jus- R
tice would “create Nazi martyrs and an opportunity for revisionists and isola-
tionists to claim once more that charges against the German enemy were
fabrications. . . .  Stimson believed that trials would force the German people
to face an irrefutable record of Nazi atrocities and as a result they would
undergo a national catharsis.” Id. (quoting WILLIAM BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON
NUREMBERG 9 (1970)).
70. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99 (1945).
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was “no purpose to incriminate the whole German people”
and that “[t]he German, no less than the non-German world,
has accounts to settle with these defendants.”71
A related focus on the political ambitions of prosecution
has defined the goals of Nuremberg’s successors.  At the open-
ing hearing of the first trial of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for example, the pros-
ecution observed:
The duty of any criminal court is onerous, but the
duty imposed on this Tribunal is a heavy burden in-
deed.  This Tribunal has been created not only to ad-
minister justice in respect of the accused that stands
before you, but there is an expectation that in so do-
ing you will contribute to a lasting peace in the coun-
try that was once Yugoslavia.72
Later, when a trial chamber of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued the first-ever genocide con-
viction by an international tribunal, U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan expressed the confidence that “I speak for the en-
tire international community when I express the hope that this
judgement will contribute to the long-term process of national
reconciliation in Rwanda.  For there can be no healing with-
out peace; there can be no peace without justice; and there
can be no justice without respect for human rights and rule of
law.”73
It is, of course, the case that regular domestic criminal
justice systems play a vital political role:  Through some combi-
nation of the standard rationales for punishment, criminal jus-
tice helps sustain the social order upon which any political sys-
tem is based.  But even to state this point only serves to high-
light the peculiar ambitions of international war crimes
prosecution.  Whether the difference is characterized as one
of degree rather than of kind,74 the political goals of domestic
71. Id. at 102-03.
72. Transcript of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Tr. May
7, 1996, at 11:13-18, http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/960507IT.htm.
73. Message from Secretary General Kofi Annan, http://www.ictr.org
(follow “about” hyperlink).
74. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordi-
nary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 763 (2004).
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justice may be described, broadly speaking, as preservational:
sustaining and improving an existing social order.
The political goals of international criminal tribunals are,
by contrast, transformational.  These courts aspire to change
the political and social conditions—via a direct link between
individual trials and broader political goals—that gave rise to
the commission of crimes in the first instance.  The operation
of justice in this context is almost by definition irregular.  An
international criminal tribunal represents the intervention of
an institution outside of the affected society, typically to ad-
dress pervasive atrocities belonging to extraordinary historical
events that have fundamentally disrupted the social order, and
typically with the hope of catalyzing societal transformation.
To the extent that the now-terminated trial of the late Serbian
dictator Slobodan Milos˘evic assists the transformation of Ser-
bian society, for example, it will do so largely by helping Ser-
bian society come to grips with the truth of Milos˘evic himself
and the criminal acts committed under his authority.  There is
little analogy between the society-wide ambition of such trials
and the incremental ways in which the prosecution of a com-
mon murderer may, for example, help make the streets safer
and deter other murderers.
2. The Limits of General Deterrence
Although the goal of political transformation remains a
dominant rationale for international criminal tribunals, it ac-
companies, as I have said, more traditional reasons to punish.
In particular, a commonly expressed hope is that the ICC,
much like domestic criminal courts, will offer a general deter-
rent against criminal activity.75  By this logic, the ICC’s prose-
cution of war crimes committed in a state like the Democratic
Republic of Congo or Sudan will not only help rehabilitate
those societies, but will also deter prospective perpetrators in
entirely different contexts.
75. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 66, at 2031, (noting the aspiration to R
“threaten those in positions of power to deter further violence.”); LEYLA
NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-75 (2002); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deter-
rence and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INTL’L L.J. 473, 473
(1999) (noting that “Supporters of the Rome Statute . . . routinely urge rati-
fication on deterrence grounds.”).
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Despite the frequency with which this rationale is in-
voked, even some advocates of the ICC have acknowledged the
difficulty of this goal.76  The ICC, of course, is only a court.
Like all its predecessor tribunals, it lacks a built-in enforce-
ment mechanism and is thus highly dependent upon the co-
operation and assistance of political powers.  Moreover, be-
cause the Court’s jurisdictional requirements limit the tribu-
nal’s reach to systematic crimes that are generally sponsored
by states or other quasi-state actors (such as rebel forces), and
because a case is only admissible if a state with jurisdiction over
the crime proves unable or unwilling to prosecute, the level of
political commitment necessary to bring perpetrators to justice
will often be extraordinary.
These basic facts, of course, pose an impediment to the
ICC’s work in any context, but the problem is particularly
acute from the perspective of a deterrence theory that relies
on rational calculation by prospective criminals.77  It is not
enough, for these purposes, that the international community
marshals the political will to facilitate prosecutions in one con-
text or another.  Instead, the international community must
sufficiently increase the general likelihood of punishment that
some individuals, especially leaders, will decline to commit
crimes prohibited by the Rome Statute in the first instance.  As
one commentator notes, “if it is true that high probability of
punishment generally deters more effectively than a severe
sanction rarely applied, the international criminal justice sys-
tem has not reached the stage at which its deterrent value may
be fairly assumed, largely due to problems of inter-State coop-
eration and State sovereignty.”78  In his opening speech to the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Justice Jackson similarly recognized that
“[w]ars are started only on the theory and in the confidence
that they can be won” and “[p]ersonal punishment, to be suf-
fered only in the event the war is lost, will probably not be a
76. See SADAT, supra note 75, at 73-75; Wippman, supra note 75, at 474; R
Akhavan, supra note 65, at 31. R
77. I recognize that one can posit a system of deterrence which relies on
irrational fears that may deter those who have no real risk of facing arrest
and punishment.  Whether the ICC can effect that sort of deterrence is an
empirical question, but it is safe to say that that prospect is also highly specu-
lative.
78. SADAT, supra note 75, at 74. R
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sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the warmakers feel
the chances of defeat to be negligible.”79
The recent example of Iraq provides an apt illustration.
Although allegations of atrocities by Saddam Hussein stretch
back decades, it required a U.S.-led invasion and occupation—
justified largely on account of the risk of weapons of mass de-
struction rather than human rights concerns—to apprehend
him and make him available for trial.  In such rare cases,
where there is political will to impose regime change, it is spec-
ulative to assume a marginal deterrent effect of threatened
prosecution beyond the threats already posed by the regime
change itself.  Indeed, if the alternative is summary execution,
as administered to fallen leaders like Italy’s Mussolini and
Romania’s Ceausescu, or domestic courts imposing the death
penalty, as Saddam Hussein and many leaders of Rwanda’s ge-
nocide have faced, the prospect of a fair international trial fol-
lowed by the ICC’s maximum term of life imprisonment ap-
pears comparatively attractive.
Given existing political realities, therefore, powerful con-
siderations dictate that international criminal tribunals should
focus primarily on assisting the particular societies in which
investigations and prosecutions are pursued, with deterrence
operating, at most, as a complementary goal to the principle
objective of societal transformation.
B. Limited Precedents
A second defining characteristic of international criminal
justice is the very limited prior use of international tribunals to
achieve the goals just described.  Historically, the international
community has employed such tribunals on an ad hoc basis to
prosecute crimes in situations in which pervasive and unspeak-
able atrocities have taken place on a widespread scale.  Typi-
cally, moreover, these efforts have taken place as the society at
the center of the atrocities undergoes a political transition to-
ward new political forces that are hostile to the wrongdoers
and committed to policies that complement the transforma-
tional ambitions of the international tribunal.
79. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 70, at 153-54 (1945).
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The paradigmatic precedent is the IMT that tried senior
Nazi officials.  Routinely cited as a historic success story for in-
ternational criminal law, the Nuremberg trials are credited
with publicizing the horrors of Nazi atrocities and, through
criminalization and fair prosecution of those acts, assisting
Germany’s transition to a liberal democratic state in which
government sponsorship of such acts would be unthinkable.
Those trials, however, did not take place in a vacuum; they
formed part of a decades-long effort to rebuild Germany as a
liberal democratic state (excluding, of course, the Soviet-occu-
pied portion which became the German Democratic Repub-
lic).  That endeavor included extensive efforts at denazifica-
tion, public education, and further trials conducted by the in-
dividual occupying powers through the Allied Control Council
and later by German authorities.  The politics of the Nurem-
berg tribunal have attracted criticism to be sure—most fre-
quently the charge of “victor’s justice” applied by the victori-
ous to the defeated80—and the historical literature has indi-
cated that the effort commanded less respect among the
German population than it did among the populations of Ger-
many’s victims.81  But such shortcomings must be viewed
against the broader question of whether even a better-exe-
cuted Nuremberg process could be conceived outside the po-
80. The Nuremberg Charter limited the IMT jurisdiction to crimes com-
mitted by those “acting in the interests of the European Axis countries.”
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nu-
remberg Charter]; see, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 641 (noting the victor’s
justice argument).  Another common criticism has highlighted the ex post
facto nature of some of the proceedings, which permitted prosecution of the
crime of aggression and crimes against humanity that had never been codi-
fied as individual crimes under international law.  The inclusion of the crime
of aggression found some support in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which
provided a multilateral prohibition on the “recourse to war for the solution
of international controversies.”  The pact was accepted by Germany and all
the other Great Powers except the Soviet Union.  That treaty, however, did
not specifically make aggressive war-making a war crime subject to individual
punishment and prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 20.  The Nuremberg Charter
also authorized the prosecution of “violations of the laws or customs of war”
which did have a background in international treaties and customs.  Nurem-
berg Charter, art. 6(b); TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 3-20.
81. See, e.g., TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 at 58
(2005).
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litical context of the post-war nation-building project of which
it formed a part.
The reemergence of ad hoc international criminal tribu-
nals has mirrored the Nuremberg precedent to the extent that
it has generally reflected a policy decision to prosecute in the
context of a political transition.  The U.N. Security Council ex-
ercised its Chapter VII powers to create the ICTR after the
Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front had overthrown the genoci-
dal Hutu-led government.  A “mixed” tribunal consisting of
both international and national judges was created in Sierra
Leone in 2002 at the conclusion of a violent conflict and pur-
suant to a U.N. Security Council mandate and an agreement
between Sierra Leone’s government and the United Nations.82
The ICTY may have been created inauspiciously in the midst
of war, but it too evolved into an institution of transitional jus-
tice recognizably within the Nuremberg model following the
North American Treaty Organization (NATO) military inter-
vention in Bosnia, a U.S.-brokered peace agreement, and the
commitment of NATO troops on the ground.  A U.S.-sup-
ported democratic revolution in Serbia in 2000 further ad-
vanced this trend, leading to the arrest and extradition, under
significant international pressure, of top Serbian suspects in-
cluding Milos˘evic.83
The jurisdiction of the ICC, however, is not limited to
such transitional scenarios.  As Mahnoush Arsanjani and W.
Michael Reisman have noted, the Court is “the archetypal ex
ante tribunal” authorized to operate “before an international se-
curity problem has been resolved or even manifested itself,
or . . . in the midst of the conflict in which the alleged crimes
occurred.”84  A central question for the ICC Prosecutor is
whether and to what extent sensitivity to such contextual con-
siderations should affect the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion.
82. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2004), http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sierrale-
one0904/sierraleone0904.pdf.
83. See BASS, supra note 11, at 271-75; 311-24.
84. Mahnoush Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-In-Action of the
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 385 (2005).
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C. Limited Capacity
A third factor that will fundamentally define prosecutorial
choice in the context of the ICC is limited prosecutorial capac-
ity.  Of course, no criminal justice system can apprehend and
prosecute every criminal it wishes to try, but there is little com-
parison between the constraints that limit a properly function-
ing domestic criminal justice system and those that define the
work of the ICC.  In many domestic systems, the balance be-
tween prosecutorial resources and the general crime rate is
such that the system can at least aspire toward something ap-
proximating universal prosecution, at least in the context of
the most serious, violent crimes.
When serious perpetrators successfully evade accountabil-
ity, the reasons generally lie in investigatory failure, lack of evi-
dence, or underreporting by victims.  Considerations of
docket control have led to plea bargaining and nonprosecu-
tion in systems that allow it or have led to other functionally
analogous methods in legal systems that do not.  Authorities
may also pursue reduced charges or decline prosecution of
some perpetrators in order to procure testimony against more
serious offenders.  But it is virtually unheard of that a peace-
time society, in the absence of official corruption, refuses
wholesale to prosecute serious criminals such as murderers or
rapists purely for reasons of docket control.
The everyday tradeoffs faced by domestic justice systems
have no real analogy in the context of international criminal
tribunals, in which a handful of prosecutors appearing before
a handful of judges seek justice for mass atrocities committed
by countless perpetrators.  The numbers speak for themselves.
At Nuremberg, the IMT prosecuted twenty-four suspects for
Nazi war crimes.85  The ethnic cleansing which followed the
breakup of Yugoslavia yielded hundreds of thousands of vic-
tims of systematic atrocities committed by many thousands of
perpetrators.  After thirteen years of operation and almost a
billion dollars in expense, the ICTY has tried ninety-four per-
petrators with an additional sixty-seven indictees either at large
or in custody.86  The Rwandan justice system has held in cus-
85. See Tusa, supra note 11, at 15; Kudriavtsev, supra note 11, at 93.
86. See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/61/271 (Aug.
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tody over 100,000 suspects at one time or another, yet in
eleven years of operation, the ICTR has tried just twenty-two
genocidaires, with an additional fifty-six in custody or at
large.87  Even the government of Rwanda, which has commit-
ted itself to a far more ambitious program of domestic prose-
cutions (often at the expense of basic procedural protections
that the international tribunals have been at pains to uphold),
cannot hope to try all of those culpable for the Rwandan geno-
cide.88  Moreover, these efforts are coming to a close.  In 2003,
the U.N. Security Council resolved that the ICTR and the
ICTY should complete all investigations by 2004, all trials by
2008, and all appeals by 2010; and requested the transfer of all
but the highest level remaining suspects to national jurisdic-
tions.89
A functioning peacetime society that experienced such
low prosecution rates would be unable to sustain the basic or-
der necessary to preserve its form of government.  That such
limited prosecution rates are not merely accepted but ex-
pected in the context of international criminal trials serves to
highlight the uniquely symbolic and political goals of these tri-
als.90
21, 2006), http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2006/AR06.pdf; ICTY Web-
site, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
87. See Achievements of the ICTR, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/fact-
sheets/achievements.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
88. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
89. S.C.Res. 1503 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28. 2003).
90. Former ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour has noted in a related con-
text that “[t]he main distinction between domestic enforcement of criminal
law, and the international context, rests upon the broad discretionary power
granted to the international Prosecutor in selecting the targets for prosecu-
tion.  Domestically, the general assumption is that enforcement is universal,
i.e. that all crimes beyond the de minimis range will be prosecuted, subject
to the determination by the Prosecutor that a charge is appropriate based on
a preliminary examination of the facts of the case. . . .  In the international
context, particularly in a system based on complementarity with State juris-
diction, the discretion to prosecute is considerably larger, and the criteria
upon which such Prosecutorial discretion is to be exercised are ill-defined,
and complex.”  Justice Louise Arbour, NATO: Statement by Justice Louise
Arbour on Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Dec. 10,
1997), in M2 PRESSWIRE, at 3 (LEXIS).  Ruti Teitel has linked the general
practice of transitional States pursuing limited prosecutions to symbolic
goals.  “Why,” she asks “despite the aftermath of the successor trials [which
have resulted in limited criminal sanctions], is it nonetheless the common
perception that at the Nuremberg Tribunal, in Greece’s Military Court, and
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\39-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 30 21-MAR-07 11:17
612 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 39:583
The powers of the ICC Prosecutor are also limited in yet
another, related way:  The ICC Prosecutor has no control over
related political events, which may affect the prospects for suc-
cessful prosecution and, more broadly, for the realization of
prosecution’s social and political goals.  Although this may be
an obvious point, it serves to distinguish the position of the
ICC Prosecutor from broader debates regarding the benefits
and scope of war crimes prosecution, which may also take into
account policies that political powers can or should imple-
ment in order to facilitate successful prosecutorial efforts.
IV. DILEMMAS OF DISCRETION
As I have emphasized previously, the structure of
prosecutorial authority under the Rome Statute reflects a com-
mitment to the idea that international criminal prosecutions
must be dictated by pure legal standards free from “political”
considerations.91  That perspective gives rise to a commonly
echoed narrative which portrays the ICC as the pinnacle of an
evolutionary history of international criminal tribunals in
which each stage “is a further step down the road from partial-
ity to impartiality.”92  The ideal of the apolitical court that mo-
tivated the drafters is shared by many commentators93 as well
as the cadre of former prosecutors who served the ad hoc
in Buenos Aires Federal Court, justice has been done?  Despite the absence
of full or lasting punishment, the transitional criminal sanction appears to
constitute a symbol of the rule of law.” TEITEL, supra note 66, at 49. R
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. Goldstone & Bass, supra note 66, at 51-52 (tracing the history from
the “victor’s justice” of Nuremberg and Tokyo, to the superior but mandate-
limited ad hoc tribunals to the ICC).
93. See, e.g., Danner, supra note 7, at 515 (“[M]aking the Court subject to R
direct political control would have constituted a betrayal of fundamental
principles.  The Prosecutor’s ability to make individualized considerations
based on law and justice, rather than the self-interest or sheer power of any
particular state, transforms the Court from a political body festooned with
the trappings of law to a legal institution with strong political undertones.”);
Ola´solo, supra note 7. R
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tribunals,94 and is even reflected in the rhetoric of the Rome
Statute’s critics.95
This ideal, however, does not present an accurate picture
of the ICC as it actually exists, and it is hard to see how it ever
could.  The difficulty here derives in part from imprecision in
the use of the word “political” itself.  One may argue that some
political considerations are by definition illegitimate and
should play no role in the decisionmaking of legal actors in-
volved in war crimes prosecutions.  For example, the fact that a
government involved in genocide may have friendly relations
or economic ties with a government that sits on the U.N. Se-
curity Council is not a valid reason to forego investigation or
prosecution.  But does the same proscription against
“politicization” apply to extra-legal considerations of historical
or political context that are concerned not with illicit motives
but with promoting the tribunal’s own institutional goals?  To
the extent that such considerations form a part of the
prosecutorial calculus, the evolution of the ICC assumes a dif-
ferent cast.  Seen in that light, the ICC reflects a more com-
plex reallocation of authority which confers upon the ICC
Prosecutor additional political functions alongside increased
legal authority.
This Part explores five interrelated problems of
prosecutorial discretion that complicate the ICC’s work. I am
not concerned here with the risk of a renegade or “politicized”
Prosecutor, which the United States invoked at the Rome Con-
ference.  Rather, my focus is on dilemmas which will compli-
cate the work of even a well-meaning Prosecutor who seeks in
good faith to perform the functions delegated to it by the
Rome Statute.
94. Arbour, supra note 90, at 3 (“The greatest threat, in my view, to the R
legitimacy of the permanent Court, would be the credible suggestion of po-
litical manipulation of the Office of the Prosecutor, or of the Court itself, for
political expediency.”); RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS
OF A WAR CRIME INVESTIGATOR 131-32 (2000) (“[T]he complete and effective
independence of the prosecutor is crucial. . . .  By their nature war crimes
investigations are politically controversial, so that the independence of a war
crimes prosecutor is even more important than that of prosecutors operat-
ing within national jurisdictions.”); Goldstone & Bass, supra note 66.
95. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. R
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A. The Problem of Amnesty
I begin with the question of amnesty, which presents a fa-
miliar problem of transitional justice that has vexed the ICC
recently with respect to the Court’s Uganda indictments.
Many states facing atrocities committed by a past regime have
chosen not to prosecute the wrongdoers, but have either ig-
nored past crimes or employed alternate mechanisms to ex-
pose and acknowledge those crimes without subjecting individ-
ual perpetrators to prosecution.96  The paradigmatic and most
celebrated example of this approach is South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which addressed polit-
ical crimes committed by both the government and its oppo-
nents during decades of apartheid.  Operating during the
country’s transition to a constitutional democracy rooted in
equal rights, the TRC offered amnesty to individual perpetra-
tors of politically motivated crimes who offered a full confes-
sion—many of them testifying in televised public proceedings
at which victims and family members were free to confront
their tormentors.97  Other states have adopted similar mecha-
nisms, with varying methods of truth-seeking and degrees of
individual accountability.  In Chile, for example, a truth com-
mission arose after the legislature passed a blanket amnesty
precluding prosecution of crimes committed by the Pinochet
regime, whereas in El Salvador, a blanket amnesty followed the
release of a truth commission report that named specific high-
level government perpetrators of notorious crimes.98
The rationales invoked to defend amnesty tend to assume
one of two standard forms.  One argument allows that prose-
96. For just a few examples from the literature dealing with this question
see, e.g., ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2001); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UN-
SPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2002);
TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg
& Dennis Thompson eds., 2000); TEITEL, supra note 66, at 69-117; MARTHA R
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:  FACING HISTORY AFTER GE-
NOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1999).
97. See 1 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (1998) [hereinafter
TRC FINAL REPORT], http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC
%20VOLUME%201.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
98. See HAYNER, supra note 96, at 35-40.  Hayner provides summaries of R
twenty-one different truth commissions which have operated from 1974 to
the present, some of which were coupled with amnesty laws. See id. at 32-71.
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cutions may be preferable under ideal circumstances, but
maintains that nonprosecutorial alternatives may be justified
as a compromise necessary to facilitate political transition to a
more just society that rebukes the evils of the past.  As Rajeev
Bhargava has observed:
[N]ormally such transitional moments emerge out of
a settlement in which former oppressors refuse to
share power unless guaranteed that they will escape
the criminal justice system characteristic of a mini-
mally decent society . . . .  The danger [of insisting
upon criminal justice] is obvious:  victims may forever
remain victims and their society may never cease to
be barbaric.99
TRC Chair Archbishop Desmond Tutu invoked this rationale
in the Commission’s final report, arguing that “[h]ad the mir-
acle of the negotiated settlement not occurred, we would have
been overwhelmed by the bloodbath that virtually everyone
predicted as the inevitable ending for South Africa.”100  Al-
though rooted in compromise, the justification is ultimately a
moral one:  Justice is sacrificed, but only for the sake of greater
future justice or other equivalent moral goods.101
This line of reasoning is, of course, highly contingent.
The mechanism that best maximizes goals of justice or moral
goods in one context does not necessarily apply in another.
To the extent, for example, that the international community
chooses to engage in Kosovo- and Iraq-style military interven-
tions aimed at regime change and proves willing to commit
itself financially and militarily to the future stability of such
societies through peacekeeping operations and the like, the
political compromise argument is less compelling.  Thus, W.
Michael Reisman has urged a diverse approach to transitional
justice, arguing that where the international community is un-
willing to make the military commitment to defeat wrongdo-
ers, “it is preferable to emphasize techniques that reestablish
public order as quickly as possible and fulfill feasible sanction-
99. Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies, in TRUTH V. JUS-
TICE, supra note 96, at 48. See also Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The R
Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 22, supra note 96. R
100. TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 97, at 5. R
101. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 99, at 23. R
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ing goals of public order.”102  At the extreme, considerations
of this sort could also be invoked to justify ever more diluted
forms of accountability, such as less-thorough or less-public
truth commissions, blanket rather than individualized amnes-
ties, or simply inaction.103
A second line of argument maintains that truth commis-
sions paired with amnesty can supply an intrinsically superior
form of transitional justice to prosecution, irrespective of polit-
ical compromises.  Martha Minow has argued that truth com-
missions “are not a second best alternative to prosecutions . . . .
When the societal goals include restoring dignity to victims,
offering a basis for individual healing, and also promoting rec-
onciliation across a divided nation, a truth commission may be
as or more powerful than prosecutions.”104  In the South Afri-
can context, Tutu has similarly advocated a form of “restora-
tive justice” rooted in forgiveness and has argued that “the
route of trials would have stretched an already hard-pressed
judicial system beyond reasonable limits.  It would also have
been counterproductive to devote years to hearing about
events that, by their nature, arouse very strong feelings.  It
would have rocked the boat massively and for too long.”105  To
accept this line of logic, one need not agree that the justice
provided by a nonprosecutorial alternative is qualitatively
equivalent or superior to conventional forms of criminal jus-
tice.  As with the political compromise rationale, one may al-
low that nonprosecutorial solutions require some sacrifice of
justice but nevertheless defend them in contexts where they
may be expected to achieve an aggregate amount of justice
greater than that which would otherwise be realized.106
102. W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Main-
taining Public Order, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL. L. 175, 186 (1995).  On the
difficulties of regime change, see also Michael W. Reisman, The Manley O.
Hudson Lecture: Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 516 (2004).
103. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 69-98 (1994)
(1992) (arguing that a policy of amnesia may better foster liberal transition
than any form of corrective justice).
104. MINOW, supra note 96, at 88-89.
105. TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 97, at ¶ 23.
106. Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty’s Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 96,
at 194-98.
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\39-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 35 21-MAR-07 11:17
2007] JUSTICE WITHOUT POLITICS? 617
This broader debate might not matter for the ICC Prose-
cutor’s specific job if the Rome Statute provided clear gui-
dance as to how the Court should respond to amnesties that
purport to cover crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.  How-
ever, it does not.  As a legal matter, some scholars have argued
that international law both requires prosecutions of perpetra-
tors of international crimes and forbids amnesties, but these
arguments are highly disputed.107  Most important for present
purposes, the question about amnesty was one which the dele-
gates to the Rome Conference both explicitly considered and
failed to resolve.108  William A. Schabas recounts that there was
great debate on this issue and that “[d]espite ‘widespread sym-
pathy’ for South Africa’s experience, some delegates ex-
pressed concern that other amnesty measures like the one ac-
corded by Chilean President Augusto Pinochet to himself,
were ‘disgraceful.’”109  Rome Conference Chair and current
ICC President Philippe Kirsch has reportedly described the fi-
nal result as a decision to settle for “creative ambiguity.”110
Thus, we are left with a Statute whose preamble affirms a gen-
eral determination to “to put an end to impunity for the per-
petrators of [serious international] crimes” but whose specific
provisions contemplate that the Prosecutor may invoke the
“interests of justice” to decline prosecution of serious offenses
that are otherwise admissible.
107. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).  A full considera-
tion of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article.  The argument is
strongest with respect to treaties such as the Genocide Convention, Geneva
Conventions, and Torture Convention that impose specific duties to prose-
cute enumerated crimes, although even in those cases there are arguments
that exceptions may exist and that morally justified amnesties are one such
exception.  For a summary of the debate, see Newman, supra note 7, at 308- R
09.
108. Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 93, 96 (1999).
109. Id.
110. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507, 521-22 (1999) (quoting con-
versation with Mr. Kirsch); see also Robinson, supra note 7, at 483 (“The draft- R
ers of the Rome Statute wisely chose not to delve into these difficult ques-
tions [of national amnesties]. . . .  [T]hey turned to the faithful and familiar
friend of diplomats, ambiguity, leaving a few small avenues open to the
Court and allowing the Court to develop an appropriate approach when
faced with concrete situations.”).
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Given the moral arguments invoked to support amnesties,
the deliberate silence of the Rome Statute, and the lack of any
clear prohibition under international law, a number of observ-
ers have maintained that the ICC and national amnesty laws
may be compatible, at least in some circumstances.111  Indeed,
no less an advocate of the ICC than former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan has argued:
No one should imagine that [the ICC] would apply
to a case like South Africa’s, where the regime and
the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an
end, and the victims have inherited power.  It is in-
conceivable that, in such a case, the Court would seek
to substitute its judgment for that of a whole nation
which is seeking the best way to put a traumatic past
behind it and build a better future.112
When the Republic of Colombia ratified the Rome Statute,
moreover, it submitted without objection from any other State
Party a declaration interpreting the Rome Statute not to pre-
clude amnesties, reprieves, or judicial pardons.113  In light of
the history surrounding amnesty, one might expect the Court
to defer to the next South Africa.  However, attitudes are, as
Schabas notes, “impossible to predict, and judges or prosecu-
tors might well decide that it is precisely in cases like the South
111. See, e.g., Helmut Gropengieber & Jo¨rg Meib ner, Amnesties and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 5 INT’L. CRIM. L. REV. 2 (2005);
Newman, supra note 7, at 317-18; Ola´solo, supra note 7, at 137-41; Robinson, R
supra note 7; SADAT, supra note 75, at 112-13 (“It is hotly contested . . . when R
and under what conditions amnesties are permissible either as a matter of
international law, or under the Statute.”); Scharf, supra note 110; TRUTH V. R
JUSTICE, supra note 96; Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Al-
ways Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions
Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 216-17 (2000).
112. Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary General Urges ‘Like
Minded’ States to Ratify Statute of International Criminal Court. U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6686 (Sep. 1, 1998), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/
19980901.sgsm6686.html [hereinafter Annan Press Release].  Notably, An-
nan relies on the goals of the Court to defend this approach, arguing that
“[t]he purpose of that [complementarity] clause in the Statute is to ensure
that mass murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a State
run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general break-
down of law and order.” Id.
113. Rome Statute, supra note 1; Declaration of Colombia, (Aug. 5, 2002); R
Newman, supra note 7, at 325.
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African one where a line must be drawn establishing that am-
nesty for such crimes is unacceptable.”114
Recent developments transpiring in Uganda as this Arti-
cle went to press have now brought this question squarely
before the Court.  Although it was Uganda’s own referral that
originally spurred the ICC Prosecutor to indict Joseph Kony
and four other leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army,115
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has now declared a cease-
fire and proposed a tentative peace deal which offers amnesty
to the accused in the form of a traditional tribal forgiveness
ritual.116  The crimes alleged—involving the systematic mur-
der, abduction, sexual enslavement, and mutilation of
Ugandan civilians—are certainly hideous, but Uganda argues
that it has no viable alternative, as neither the domestic au-
thority nor the ICC is capable of arresting the accused.  Some
reports suggest, moreover, that the amnesty proposal enjoys
strong domestic support in Uganda.117
Amnesty, however, is not Uganda’s alone to give, and re-
ports indicate that the ICC’s outstanding warrants are proving
to be a stumbling block.118  In a recent public statement
Moreno-Ocampo emphasized that the Uganda warrants
should be executed, but he has yet to announce a broader pol-
icy indicating whether, and under what conditions, that man-
date might give way to other considerations.119
In sum, then, the amnesty debate poses a critical dilemma
for the ICC Prosecutor.  The language and context of the
Rome Statute suggest that the Prosecutor may sometimes
114. SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 69. R
115. See ICC Press Release, supra note 57; Uganda Arrest Warrants, supra R
note 58.
116. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda: Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A1.
117. For example, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator has concluded following a recent
trip to Uganda that “[t]he predominant feeling among all the stakeholders
in the peace process is that the ICC warrant of arrest should be dropped
against the LRA leaders so that a peaceful conclusion to the talks can be
reached.”  Grace Matsiko et al., Kony Charges a Stumbling Block, Says UN Chief,
MONITOR (Uganda), Sept. 13, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15910098.
118. Id.
119. ICC says Uganda crimes may go on without arrests, REUTERS (Sept. 26,
2006), http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L26206
254.
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forego prosecution in deference to amnesty arrangements, but
the considerations inherent in that determination invite the
kind of broad-based policy assessments that the ICC was osten-
sibly designed to eliminate.
B. Selective Prosecution
It may be tempting to view the questions raised by nonp-
rosecutorial mechanisms as a kind of side issue to the primary
work of international criminal prosecution.  In this view, peo-
ple may argue about whether amnesties should ever be pur-
sued, but that debate has little to say about the mechanics of
prosecution itself in situations where formal amnesties are not
at play.  The reality, however, is far more complex than this
simple assumption.  The decision in transitional situations is
not simply whether to prosecute, but whom to prosecute, and
how broadly.
And it is here that we come across a remarkable fact:  In
contrast to the division provoked by the amnesty debate, there
appears to be broad agreement that transitional states facing
mass atrocities may adopt a policy of targeted, highly selective
prosecutions which leave the vast majority of criminals unpros-
ecuted.  Orentlicher, for example, who has advanced the best
known and most systematic argument for a duty to prosecute
under international law, also argues that a state may, and even
should, fulfill its international duties through a program of
partial, “exemplary” prosecution.120  Other prominent sup-
porters of a duty to prosecute have endorsed similar argu-
ments.121
Exemplary prosecution—or what Ruti Teitel has termed
the “limited sanction” to include consideration of both limited
prosecutions and limited punishment—also appears to re-
120. Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 2598-99. R
121. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni et. al., Proposed Guiding Principles for Com-
bating Impunity, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 255, 261 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
2002) (“Prosecution of all the perpetrators of widespread international crim-
inal acts is sometimes impractical if not impossible.  Selective prosecution
and use of ‘exemplary prosecution’ is accepted in principle in virtually all
legal systems and is therefore consistent with general principles of law.”);
Robinson, supra note 7, at 493 (summarizing this position and advancing the
proposition that “In Transitional Situations following Mass Violence, a
Targeted Programme Prosecuting Only Those Most Responsible May Be Ap-
propriate”).
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present the near universal practice of those transitional states
that do opt for criminal punishment to address crimes com-
mitted by the past regime.122  From post-war Germany to
Greece, Argentina, and the former Communist states of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, prosecutorial efforts have been
marked as much for their restraint as for their ambition.123
The underlying rationale is similar to that used to defend
amnesties:  More extensive efforts at backward-looking crimi-
nal justice may prove politically impossible or socially disrup-
tive, or may be excessively onerous given limited resources and
weak institutions.124  The limited sanction may also, as Teitel
argues, reflect some acknowledgment of a “diminished sense
of blameworthiness and related criminal responsibility associ-
ated with periods of nondemocratic rule.”125  By prosecuting
the few, rather than the many, the transitional state may seek
to acknowledge past wrongs, assign blame, mark a break from
the past, and provide some sense of collective justice without
jeopardizing the forward-looking goals of a liberalizing politi-
cal transition.
1. International Law
Although the basic rationale for exemplary prosecution
may arise out of compelling policy considerations, the legal
argument for such prosecution is an odd one when considered
against the background of the legal sources typically cited in
support of a duty to prosecute.  Take, for example, article 4 of
the Genocide Convention, which states that “[p]ersons com-
mitting genocide . . . shall be punished,” or language in the
122. TEITEL, supra note 66, at 46-51. R
123. Id.
124. Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 2598 (“The contrasting experiences of R
Argentina and Greece suggest that the demands of justice and political sta-
bility are best reconciled through a program of prosecutions that has de-
fined limits.”).
125. TEITEL, supra note 66, at 50.  Reisman makes a similar point about R
blameworthiness, and has argued that “[i]n many of the most hideous inter-
national crimes, many of the individuals who are directly responsible oper-
ate within a cultural universe that inverts our morality and elevates their ac-
tions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national defense . . . .  [T]he
perpetrators may not have had the moral choice that is central to our notion
of criminal responsibility.”  W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide
and Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75,
77 (Autumn 1996).
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Geneva Conventions requiring states to prosecute or extradite
those who have committed grave breaches of the conven-
tions.126  If one reads that language as precluding an amnesty
exception for transitional societies even when morally justi-
fied, how does one simultaneously construct an argument that
a state can ignore the vast majority of perpetrators as long as it
prosecutes some?  Both readings would seem incompatible
with the text, the difference being that the latter approach
promises more effective prosecution than the former.  Oren-
tlicher appears to acknowledge this point, and argues that
“treaties should be interpreted in a manner that avoids impos-
ing impossible obligations or duties whose discharge would
prove harmful.”127  But that argument simply begs the ques-
tion of what is “possible” or not “harmful” under the circum-
stances and why exemplary prosecutions but not amnesty laws
are appropriate subjects of such debate.  Here, Orentlicher in-
vokes a “functional” argument that the underlying goal of de-
terrence—allegedly promoted by exemplary prosecution but
not amnesty—supports her proposed interpretation.128  Even
putting aside the broader question of whether trials deter, or
whether deterrence is the best rationale for prosecution, that
claim provides a rationale for insisting on exemplary prosecu-
tion to the exclusion of comprehensive amnesties only if one
first rejects the central moral claim of amnesty advocates:
namely, that the kind of political transition which might make
prosecution (and hence deterrence) possible in the first place
may not be possible without an amnesty deal that precludes
prosecution.
Moreover, even accepting the argument for exemplary
prosecution, one is still faced with a wide range of possibilities
for how to reconcile the demands of criminal justice for past
126. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. 4; Geneva Convention rela- R
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 146, 147,
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 49, 50, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 50,
51, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 129, 130, adopted Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
127. Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 2600, n.284. R
128. Id. at 2600.
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crimes with the realities of resource constraints and the politi-
cal stability necessary to achieve a just future society.  If one is
to take seriously Orentlicher’s claim that some prosecution is
mandatory, but that too much prosecution may “have dimin-
ishing returns and may reverse progress toward consolidating
a democratic transition,”129 then the legal clarity of the alleged
duty to prosecute quickly transforms into a subjective, context-
specific judgment that hinges on empirical predictions rather
than meaningful legal standards.
Not surprisingly, historical precedents reflect a range of
approaches on the part of transitional states.  At one extreme,
to take an example explored by Orentlicher, is the case of Ar-
gentina, where a transitional government established a truth
commission and commenced prosecutions in connection with
an estimated 14,000 to 30,000 disappearances and other
crimes committed during the “dirty war” waged by Argentina’s
military junta against political opponents in the 1970s and
early 1980s.  The effort resulted in the historic and highly pub-
licized conviction of five high-level military commanders.
However, military uprisings frustrated attempts to extend the
trials to active-duty mid-ranking officers and ultimately led to a
series of amnesty laws and pardons which precluded the prose-
cution of all perpetrators, excepting the five military com-
manders and two other individuals already convicted.130  In
2005, Argentina’s Supreme Court declared Argentina’s am-
nesty laws unconstitutional, and the government has since
brought charges against some two hundred former military of-
ficers.131  How extensive these renewed efforts will ultimately
129. Orentlicher, supra note 107, at 2598-99. R
130. Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina:
Partial Failure or Qualified Success, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1993-1994).
Although Orentlicher views Argentina’s efforts as inadequate, she argues the
transitional government should have limited the scope of prosecutions from
the beginning rather than pursue a more ambitious and protracted plan
which then triggered social unrest.  Orentlicher, supra note 107 at 2597. R
This fact-based argument hinges on Orentlicher’s own disputed interpreta-
tion of contingent historical events and does not exclude, as a legal matter,
that Argentina’s efforts could reflect sufficient exemplary punishment.
131. Argentina: The Slow Battle for Justice, ECONOMIST, Sep. 14, 2006, at 47;
Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down (June 14,
2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14/argent11119.htm.
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prove to be remains to be seen,132 and the question of what
justice policies are possible and beneficial for Argentina today
is, of course, analytically distinct from the dilemmas that faced
the country in a more fragile period of transition two decades
ago.  Writing in 1991, for example, law professor and former
government advisor Carlos S. Nino argued that “[t]he results
[of the investigation and prosecution of past human rights
abuses] were nearly all that could be morally required under
the circumstances.”133
Rwanda represents another example, presenting different
challenges faced on a larger scale by a transitional government
less politically constrained than Argentina’s in its commitment
to seek criminal justice.  Following the genocide of an esti-
mated 800,000 members of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority in 1994,
and the subsequent military defeat of the genocidal regime, a
Tutsi-dominated multiethnic government undertook steps to
prosecute the guilty.134  Although it is hard to doubt Rwanda’s
incentives, it too has had to confront the difficulty of attempt-
ing anything close to universal prosecution of offenders.
Faced with its own inability to try the great majority of suspects
in the regular justice system (as of 2002 Rwanda had processed
slightly over 7,000 genocide cases in eight years whereas over
100,000 suspects remained in pre-trial detention) and faced
with compelling reasons to promote reconciliation (Rwandan
Tutsis remain a vulnerable minority in a Hutu-majority coun-
try), Rwanda’s legislature passed a special plea-bargaining
scheme.135  Whereas designated “Category I” leaders and or-
132. For example, current Argentine President Ne´stor Kirchner is quoted
to have complained that “[t]hey say that there were more than 490 concen-
tration camps and we barely have 200 people arrested.  There must have
been concentration camps where the prisoners looked after themselves!” Id.
133. Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Human Rights Abuses Put Into
Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2637 (1990).
134. For an account of the Rwanda genocide see, e.g,, PHILIP GOUREVITCH,
WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES:  STORIES FROM RWANDA (1999).
135. See Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization
of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
against Humanity committed since October 1, 1990 (Rwanda), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm [hereinafter
“Rwanda Genocide Law”]; Organic Law 40/200 of 26/01 setting up “Gacaca
Jurisdictions” and organizing prosecutions for offenses constituting the
crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed between October
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ganizers of the genocide face full trials and remain subject to
the death penalty,136 all other offenders, including both “regu-
lar” genocidal murderers and confessed Category I offenders
not previously designated as such, are removed from the regu-
lar justice system and subject to informal village trials presided
over by village elders who are nonprofessional judges and who
are required to offer massively reduced sentences in exchange
for guilty pleas.  For example, murderers who confess prior to
trial face a prison term of only three and a half years plus an
equal term of community service.137  Because the primary pool
of suspects consists of tens of thousands of persons who have
already spent significant time in pre-trial detention (many
since 1994),138 the effect of the plea bargain regime has been
that large numbers of confessed genocidal murderers and
other violent offenders are reintegrated into their communi-
ties at the conclusion of their trial, with only their community
service obligation left to undertake.139
As these examples suggest, the impracticably of full prose-
cution may be less troubling itself than the question of what
exactly a regime of “exemplary prosecution” should require
and whether such a generalized requirement can even prove
meaningful in the context of particular circumstances.140  The
1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 (as modified by Organic Law 33/2001)
(Rwanda), http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnLaw.htm [hereinafter
“Gacaca Law”]. See generally Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An
Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355 (2004).
136. Rwanda Genocide Law, supra note 135. R
137. Gacaca Law, supra note 135, art. 69(c).
138. The U.S. State Department’s 2004 Human Rights report noted that
“[a]pproximately 80,000 individuals accused of genocide continued to be
imprisoned while awaiting trial” and that “some suspects had been in jail
since 1994.” U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES – 2004: RWANDA (2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/
41621.htm.  The previous year’s report cites a figure of 88,000 detainees,
ninety percent of whom were awaiting trial on genocide charges, and also
reports that 24,000 had been released from detention to await their gacaca
trial. U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES –
2003: RWANDA (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2003/27744.htm.
139. American University Washington College of Law, Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, International Legal Updates, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS
BRIEF 31 (2005).
140. Nino argues, for example that any duty to prosecute must be ex-
tended to include a “duty of governments to safeguard human rights from
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distinction between prosecution and nonprosecution can be a
slippery one, both at the level of systemic policy (who must be
prosecuted and how many prosecutions are enough?) and at
the level of the individual perpetrator (what counts as a crimi-
nal trial and criminal conviction?).  Governments facing politi-
cal transitions have employed and combined a variety of strate-
gies, including blanket amnesties, conditional amnesties, truth
commissions, exemplary prosecutions of high-level perpetra-
tors, plea-bargaining, and simple refusals to investigate or
prosecute categories of suspects.  Even South Africa’s ap-
proach—often discussed as a paradigmatic example of a nonp-
rosecutorial model—was more complex than that.  As a formal
matter, South Africa’s time-limited, case-by-case amnesty pro-
cess would appear consistent with a form of exemplary prose-
cution.  And indeed, during the time of the TRC’s operation,
South African authorities also pursued select prosecutions of a
few high-profile suspects who had not sought the TRC’s am-
nesty.141  But despite the failure of the great majority of perpe-
trators to seek the TRC’s protection, the authorities have gen-
erally declined to pursue further prosecutions of apartheid-era
crimes, notwithstanding the continued eligibility of many sus-
pects for criminal trials.142  Viewed from another perspective,
then, there may be less difference than sometimes assumed
between South Africa’s conditional amnesties and a policy of
blanket amnesty.
2. The ICC and Selective Prosecution
The question directly faced by the ICC Prosecutor, of
course, is not identical to the one confronting a government
seeking to develop its own prosecution strategy.  Because the
future violation by the government or other parties” and this broader duty
must recognize that “what may appear to the international community to be
passivity on the part of a government may actually be the active safeguarding
against future violations at the cost of foregoing prosecution of past crimes.”
Nino, supra note 133, at 2639.  Nino does not reduce this broader duty to a
judicially enforceable test but instead contemplates more generally that  “the
international community would assume responsibility for upholding the
general duty I am proposing.” Id.
141. See TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 97, at 11.
142. Paul Van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion’s Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid Africa, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
supra note 121 at 754.
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ICC can only prosecute so many offenders, the ICC Prosecutor
might appear to have a more focused task.  It need focus only
on the select group of suspects who merit the attention of the
ICC, leaving the broader questions of political compromise to
other actors.  And in this respect, something of a consensus
has emerged that the ICC Prosecutor should negotiate the in-
herent limitations of prosecutorial capacity by focusing investi-
gations and prosecutions on those culpable individuals who
occupied the highest levels of political or military authority.143
The emphasis on the prosecution of high-level perpetra-
tors reflects the general practice of international tribunals to
date, all of which, with limited exception, have focused on se-
nior-level perpetrators.144  The charters of the post-World War
II IMTs explicitly focused on the “major war criminals of the
European Axis” and “in the Far East,”145 respectively, whereas
the U.N. Security Council has issued resolutions endorsing this
prosecutorial strategy for the ICTY and ICTR as well.146  In a
143. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, Accountability for Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE 3, 27 (2002) (“As a matter of policy, international prosecutions
should be limited to leaders, policy-makers and senior executors.  This pol-
icy does not and should not preclude prosecutions of other persons at the
national level which can be necessary to achieve particular goals.”); see also
Danner, supra note 7 at 543 (“That the international justice forum should be R
reserved for high-level perpetrators has gained wide acceptance.”).
144. The ICTY provides both the exception and the rule.  It focused on
some relatively low level suspects during its early, difficult period when ongo-
ing war and lack of political cooperation complicated its work.  In 1998, how-
ever, the prosecutors actually dropped indictments against fourteen suspects
accused of war crimes in Bosnian Serb-run concentration camps solely on
the ground of giving priority to high-level suspects. See Press Release CC/
PIU/314-E, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Statement of
the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal of the Charges Against 14 Accused
(May 8, 1998) [hereinafter ICTY Press Release], http://www.un.org/icty/
latest-e/index.htm (follow “Press Release Archive” hyperlink; then follow
“1998” hyperlink; then follow “CC/PIU/315-E” hyperlink) (emphasis ad-
ded). BASS, supra note 11, at 223. R
145. Nuremberg Charter, art. 1; Charter of the Int’l Military Tribunal for
the Far East, art. 1, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 4 Bevans 20 (1968).
146. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28. 2003) (“Recalling
and reaffirming in the strongest terms the statement of 23 July 2002 made by
the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/21), which endorsed
the ICTY’s strategy for completing investigations . . . by concentrating on the
prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible for crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction and transferring cases
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policy paper issued in September 2003, the ICC OTP formally
adopted the same approach as a guideline for its own work,
concluding that “as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecu-
tor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and
resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such
as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible
for those crimes.”147
There is an obvious intuitive appeal to this policy.
Granted, one might ask whether high-level offenders should
be given priority in all circumstances.148  And the standard for
assigning culpability based on command responsibility is
broad enough to encompass situations where the guilt of
higher-level commanders may reflect less moral culpability
than that of subordinates more directly linked to the primary
offense.149  But powerful considerations dictate that if one is to
pursue a path of prosecution, and if one must make selections,
it makes sense to give priority to high-level offenders, at least
where those offenders exhibit a high degree of culpability.
involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility to competent
national jurisdictions, as appropriate, as well as the strengthening of the ca-
pacity of such jurisdictions.”).
147. Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor 7
(Sept. 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Pa-
per.pdf [hereinafter “OTP Policy Paper”].
148. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INTL. L. 365, 399-401 (1999) (emphasizing, in the
Rwandan context, the importance of prosecuting lower level offenders);
Madeline Morris, Complementarity and its Discontents: States, Victims, and the In-
ternational Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 187 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000) (arguing that the prosecution of some low-level suspects
by the ICC will “acknowledge[ ] the interests of victims and their legitimacy”
and may provide a “symbolic retributive value” even to those victims “whose
own individual perpetrators are not prosecuted”).
149. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 28.  For military commanders, the
Rome Statute adopts a negligence-based approach to command responsibil-
ity, holding such persons criminally responsible for crimes committed by
forces under their “effective command and control” or “effective authority
and control” where a commander “either knew or . . . should have known”
that the forces were committing or about to commit crimes and “[t]hat mili-
tary commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable mea-
sures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecu-
tion.” Id. For other superiors, a somewhat stricter standard applies which
requires “conscious[ ] disregard” of criminal behavior. Id.
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The planners and leaders of atrocities are broadly considered
the most culpable, their arrest and prosecution is likely to have
the greatest symbolic value and provide the greatest sense of
justice for the largest number of victims, their incarceration is
most likely to aid political transition, they provide a relatively
narrow target for deterrence, and the deterrence resulting
from their punishment, if effective, will have a broader impact
than that of individual low-level perpetrators.
But simply to state that the prosecution of higher-level of-
fenders should take priority over lower-level offenders does
not insulate the ICC Prosecutor from the dilemmas of transi-
tional justice.  Unlike the ad hoc tribunals which have exer-
cised unfettered primacy over proceedings in domestic
courts,150 the ICC is designed to address only those crimes that
a state has proven “unwilling or unable” to investigate and
prosecute.  This structural feature is often described as a con-
servative check on prosecutorial authority,151 but it also has a
more radical side.  Because the ICC’s mandate is limited to the
unprosecuted (or more precisely, those who have not received
an actual or “genuine” investigation or prosecution), the exe-
cution of an uninvited ICC indictment generally sends a signal
that a state is not doing what it should.152  This fact has signifi-
cant implications for the ICC’s work.  First, it emphasizes that
a state’s entire prosecutorial strategy is a matter of interna-
tional concern:  As long as there remain unprosecuted persons
150. For a critical view on this policy in the context of Rwanda, see Alva-
rez, supra note 148; Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction:
The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (1997).
151. See, e.g., de Gurmendi, supra note 22, at 181 (observing that, at the
Rome Conference, “some of the. . . fears [of an overzealous or politically
motivated Prosecutor] were dismissed by the supporters of proprio motu pow-
ers who argued that the stringent criteria provided for in the complementar-
ity regime would considerably narrow the scope of situations that could be
targeted by the Prosecutor.”); GOLDSTONE, supra note 94, at 129 (“A further
protection from unfounded prosecutions is to be found in what has been
referred to as the system of complementarity.”).
152. I am focused here in particular on cases in which ICC indictment
results from a case that is admissible on account of a state’s unwillingness to
prosecute rather than its inability based, for example, on the occupation of
its territory by enemy forces.  As already mentioned, the ICC’s investigations
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda are the results of referrals
issued by those very States.  On the potential political and legal difficulties
related to State referrals of crimes in their own territory, see Arsanjani &
Reisman, supra note 84.
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for whom there is evidence to support a conviction under the
Rome Statute, the prospect of ICC action remains.  Second, it
ensures that in one fundamental way, the Prosecutor’s author-
ity is unrestrained.  Although the ICC may not have the re-
sources to prosecute all perpetrators of crimes within its juris-
diction, the Prosecutor can always indict some unprosecuted
suspects and in that way signal that the state in question has
not done enough to address international crimes.
This implication of complementarity may be of little prac-
tical significance when the Court faces a pre-transitional crimi-
nal regime that acts to secure its own impunity.  Here, one can
imagine the ICC OTP proceeding much in the same manner
as its predecessors at the ad hoc tribunals.  But that is also the
situation in which the ICC’s power is most likely to remain
symbolic.  Absent extraordinary international pressure or a
military intervention, the very unwillingness of the regime to
prosecute criminals will also preclude the ICC from securing
custody over defendants who remain under the regime’s pro-
tection.  The thornier questions arise in the transitional setting
in which a successor regime desiring to become a good citizen
in the international community undertakes efforts that fall
short of universal prosecution.  That is the situation in which
ICC indictments are most likely to lead to actual arrests.  And
in that situation, the Prosecutor cannot simply apply a policy
of targeting high-level offenders without having some deeper
sense of this policy’s underlying goals.
If it were clear what states should do in these situations, a
straightforward prosecutorial policy would offer itself:  The
Prosecutor would indict unprosecuted suspects as long as
there remained unprosecuted suspects whom the state was ob-
ligated to bring to justice.  There would be no need to set an
arbitrary cut-off:  The only relevant question would be whether
the state had done enough.153  The problem is that the Rome
Statute does not provide this guidance.  Instead article 53,
read together with the complementarity regime, appears to set
153. I accept, of course, that the very existence of the ICC may increase
the number of optimal prosecutions by increasing bureaucratic capacity and
eliminating some of the domestic political pressures that could hinder do-
mestic proceedings.  But this consideration—itself context-specific—does
not affect the basic problem of how far a state should be expected to pursue
justice.
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forth the following inconclusive set of obligations and rights:
(1) States have an overarching duty to pursue justice, which in
some instances may trump the imperatives of prosecution, (2)
the ICC may second guess whether a state’s actions are consis-
tent with this overarching duty, and (3) a state may preclude
the ICC’s prosecution of a particular individual by genuinely
investigating and/or prosecuting that individual.
The OTP’s existing policy statement fails to confront the
problem raised by this framework.  It seems to suggest that the
focus on highest-level perpetrators arises as a kind of per se
rule.  It concludes in this regard that “[t]he global character of
the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical constraints sup-
port a preliminary recommendation that, as a general rule, the
Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial
efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such
as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those
crimes.”154  But the arguments marshaled in defense of this
view do not provide persuasive reasons to treat this policy as a
general limitation rather than simply a question of assigning
priority.
The policy statement relies principally on a logic that ap-
pears to equate the seniority of the perpetrator with the gravity
of the crime and thus justifies its policy of targeting high-level
perpetrators based on language in the Rome Statute which
emphasizes that the ICC is concerned with serious crimes and
that cases are not admissible if “not of sufficient gravity to jus-
tify further action by the Court.”155  Taken at face value, this
argument could be read to suggest that the ICC Prosecutor is
simply concerned with prosecuting those whom it is author-
ized to target by the Rome Statute itself.  But can one really
limit the Court’s jurisdiction or admissibility requirements to
crimes committed by the handful of top leaders whom the ICC
has the institutional capacity to prosecute?  Not even the OTP
appears to take this statutory argument too seriously:  It notes
that “[i]n some cases the focus of an investigation by the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor may go wider than high-ranking officers,
if investigation of certain type of crimes [or] those officers
lower down the chain of command is necessary for the whole
154. OTP Policy Paper, supra note 147, at 7.
155. See id. at 6-7 (citing Rome Statute at pmbl., art. 5, and art. 17(1)(d)).
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case.”156  To the extent that such concepts have any meaning
at all, the seriousness or gravity of an individual’s crime can
hardly be determined by reference to whether, as an adminis-
trative or evidentiary matter, prosecution of that individual’s
case is necessary to the prosecution of other persons who have
committed crimes that independently meet the statutory
threshold.
Elsewhere, the Policy Paper endorses, in principle, the
goal of universal prosecution.  It notes that “[t]he strategy of
focusing on those who bear the greatest responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court will leave an impu-
nity gap unless national authorities, the international commu-
nity and the Court work together to ensure that all appropri-
ate means for bringing other perpetrators to justice are
used.”157  For those offenders who are not captured under the
policy of targeting the highest-level offenders, the Policy Paper
observes that “alternative means for resolving the situation
may be necessary, whether by encouraging and facilitating na-
tional prosecutions, by strengthening or rebuilding national
justice systems, by providing international assistance to those
systems, or by some other means.”158  It further argues that the
ICC’s own focus on high-level perpetrators may provide pre-
cisely such encouragement:
If the ICC has successfully prosecuted the leaders of a
state or organization, the situation in the country
concerned might then be such as to inspire confi-
dence in the national jurisdiction.  The reinvigorated
national authorities might now be able to deal with
the other cases.  In other instances, the international
community might be ready to combine national and
international efforts to ensure that perpetrators of se-
rious international crimes are brought to justice.159
But, again, this specific example only speaks to cases in
which the ICC is at liberty to prosecute the highest level of
offenders, which may not pertain if the state itself undertakes
exemplary prosecution.  If the ICC were truly concerned with
eliminating the “impunity gap,” would the prosecution of ad-
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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ditional lower-level persons not captured by the state policy
not further encourage national and international efforts by
drawing attention to the “impunity gap” that the state’s own
policy had created?
One cannot help but suspect that what truly underlies this
policy is some acknowledgment that states recovering from
mass atrocities may legitimately seek to balance the interests of
prosecution against other considerations of resource alloca-
tion and future reconciliation that may counsel against full
prosecution.  But if that is the case, then we are left with the
same problem I previously posed:  How does the ICC Prosecu-
tor make principled distinctions between which methods of
balancing are acceptable and which are not?  Can it possibly
be that a state’s optimal transitional prosecution strategy hap-
pens to coincide with the number of high-ranking perpetra-
tors whom the ICC would otherwise be able to prosecute con-
sistent with its own institutional limits?  Again, once the goals
of prosecution are balanced against the broader context-spe-
cific goals of political transition and reconciliation, the line be-
tween prosecution and amnesty begins to blur.  In place of
stark distinctions stands a continuum of options, none of
which emerges, a priori, as the obvious best choice.
What the problem of exemplary prosecution highlights,
therefore, is that the ICC Prosecutor cannot make even indi-
vidual charging decisions without also assessing, as a broader
matter, whether a state’s transitional justice efforts as a whole
are adequate.  And that broader question involves precisely
the kind of complex political calculations that the structure of
the ICC was ostensibly designed to avoid.
C. Positive Law and Moral Debate
The nature of the crimes covered by the Rome Statute
and predecessor tribunals is central to the mission of the Inter-
national Criminal Court.  From Nuremberg forward, interna-
tional criminal tribunals have arisen in the wake of atrocities
involving either genocide or mass murders that have qualified
as crimes against humanity.  The preamble to the Rome Stat-
ute itself recalls this paradigmatic context when it notes that
“millions of children, women and men have been victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity,” “[r]ecogniz[es] that such grave crimes threaten
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the peace, security and well-being of the world” and therefore
expresses a “[d]etermin[ation] to put an end to impunity for
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes.”160
There is a tendency to understand the substantive crimes
set forth in the Rome Statute with these past precedents in
mind.  One commentator, for example, has argued that “the
jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to . . . crimes [that] are cau-
tiously defined so as to focus on atrocities of particular scale
and severity.”161  But such statements do not appear justified
by the text of the Rome Statute, whose reach extends to a
broader range of conduct than the kinds atrocities which gave
rise to international prosecutions in the past.  This realization
raises questions about whether, and to what extent, the ICC
Prosecutor should limit investigations and indictments to situ-
ations that fit the standard contexts associated with interna-
tional criminal prosecution.
NATO’s military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo in 1999 presents a much-debated problem of
prosecutorial discretion that may preview the difficulties that
will confront the ICC Prosecutor.  During NATO’s Operation
Allied Force, airplanes launched a missile attack on the Bel-
grade headquarters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s
state-owned media company Serbian Radio and Television
(RTS), killing sixteen civilians inside and damaging the build-
ing.162  NATO justified its action on two distinct grounds:  that
the facilities were being used as a relay station to support mili-
tary communications and that Milos˘evic’s regime was using the
state-owned television as a means of disseminating propaganda
favorable to its murderous campaign in Kosovo.163  It also ar-
160. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl. R
161. Robinson, supra note 7, at 485.  Prior to the adoption of the Rome R
Statute, Louise Arbour made a similar point concerning the general practice
of international tribunals, noting that “[g]enerally speaking recourse to an
international criminal forum will only occur when horrendous crimes have
been committed with the collusion or impotence of national authorities.”
Arbour, supra note 90, at 1. R
162. See generally Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Estab-
lished to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia, paras. 71-79, (June 13, 2000), www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
nato061300.htm [hereinafter “ICTY NATO Report”].
163. Id. paras. 73-74.
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gued that it had taken measures to reduce civilian casualties,
including giving advance warning of the target to the Yugoslav
government.164  Critics, however, argued that this action vio-
lated applicable rules of war prohibiting the intentional target-
ing of nonmilitary objects and requiring military actions to be
pursued without disproportionate loss of civilian life.165
Then ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour created a special
committee to look into these and other allegations of NATO
war crimes, and the following year the committee issued a re-
port in which it recommended against initiating a formal in-
vestigation.166  Arbour’s successor and current ICTY Prosecu-
tor Carla Del Ponte declined investigation and cited the re-
port, which she also released publicly, as the basis for her
decision.167
Taken at face value, the committee’s recommendations
turned solely on the question of whether the missile attack was
“legally acceptable.”168  In concluding that it was, the commit-
tee accepted NATO’s word that the primary goal was to disable
Serbia’s military communication system, with the disruption of
propaganda operating only as an “incidental” and “comple-
mentary” goal.  The committee also indicated, however, that
164. Id. para. 77.
165. See, e.g., Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
“Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO
During Operation Allied Force, AI Index: EUR 70/18/00, June 2000 [hereinaf-
ter Amnesty International Report]; Danner, supra note 7, at 538-40; Andreas R
Laursen, Nato, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 765, 778 (2003); Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in Inter-
national Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to be Learned
From It, 25 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 95 (2001).
166. See ICTY NATO Report, supra note 162, para. 91.
167. ICTY Press Release supra note 144.
168. ICTY NATO Report, supra note 162, para. 5 (“In the course of its
review, the committee has applied the same criteria to NATO activities that
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has applied to the activities of other
actors in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  The committee paid particu-
lar heed to the following questions: (a) Are the prohibitions alleged suffi-
ciently well-established as violations of international humanitarian law to
form the basis of a prosecution, and does the application of the law to the
particular facts reasonably suggest that a violation of these prohibitions may
have occurred? and (b) upon the reasoned evaluation of the information by
the committee, is the information credible and does it tend to show that
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed by
individuals during the NATO bombing campaign?”).
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the attack would have been a war crime worthy of investigation
and prosecution had the anti-propagandistic motive been the
primary one.169  Apparently, there was evidence to support
that alternate finding:  An Amnesty International report indi-
cates that in the period immediately following the attack, sev-
eral NATO officials, including British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, defended the strike solely as an attempt to dismantle
Milos˘evic’s propaganda apparatus.170
However one assesses the merits of the allegations against
NATO, clearly this episode presents a context very different
from the one that has traditionally framed the operation of
international tribunals.  We are faced not with rules proscrib-
ing the deepest moral offenses of human history, but instead
with traditional rules of war—often vaguely phrased—that
cover the details of military tactics in situations that are more
susceptible to legal and moral debate concerning the propri-
ety of particular objectives and means, and with the changing
nature of warfare.  What are the proper standards governing
the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable targets,
and collateral damages to civilians?  Is the disruption of hate-
ful propaganda used to support a war effort necessarily an ille-
gitimate military aim?  These questions are open for reasona-
ble debate in a way, for example, that the propriety of geno-
169. Id. para. 47.  Citing the example of Rwanda, in which the radio was
used to incite and direct the commission of genocide against Tutsis, the re-
port urges that “[i]f the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it
is a legitimate target.  If it is merely disseminating propaganda to generate
support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.” Id. Danner has ar-
gued that the ICTY Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation was
“entirely consistent with the OTP’s preexisting prosecution strategy” of
“[t]argeting high level officials or individuals who had perpetrated particu-
lar heinous offenses.”  Danner, supra note 7, at 540.  But the policy statement R
evidencing that strategy employs the disjunctive when it endorses a policy of
“maintaining an investigative focus on persons holding higher levels of re-
sponsibility, or on those who have been personally responsible for the excep-
tionally brutal or otherwise extremely serious offences.”  ICTY Press Release
supra note 144;  Danner, supra note 7, at 540 n. 254 (quoting the same).  As R
thus phrased, ICTY’s preexisting policy would have supported rather than
discouraged prosecution of high-level NATO officials.  In justifying her deci-
sion not to initiate investigation, Del Ponte relied exclusively the committee
report, which did not focus on gravity considerations, as the basis for her
decision. See ICTY NATO Report, supra note 162, para. 5.
170. Amnesty International Report, supra note 165, at 49.
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cide is not.171  In contrast to the kinds of acts which have
provoked the intervention of criminal tribunals in the past,
one could argue that NATO’s actions, committed as part of a
humanitarian intervention and with the presumed intent of
bringing a faster close to its campaign, involved far less moral
culpability than the standard violent crime that finds no place
in the lexicon of international criminal law but is prosecuted
every day in domestic jurisdictions.
Moreover, although the specific incident at issue arose in
the context of the ICTY, the Rome Statute also prohibit attacks
on civilians and civilian objects as well as incidental harm to
civilians and civilian objects that is “clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage antici-
pated.”172  The Statute also embraces a broader list of rules
and customs of war which include, to name a few, prohibitions
against the unnecessary destruction of enemy property, the im-
proper use of enemy or U.N. flags, and the commission of “ou-
trages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment.”173
If one seeks to understand the vehemence of the U.S. op-
position to an institution created to address “unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,” one
must start by considering the prospect that investigations and
prosecutions might arise out of more disputed exercises of mil-
itary judgment.  As Jack Goldsmith has argued, “[t]he real con-
cern is that the indeterminateness of international criminal
law makes it easy to imagine the ICC and the United States
having genuine, principled disagreements about whether a
171. It is worth emphasizing that even the ICTY committee investigating
NATO’s action did not perceive a per se prohibition on targeting media
infrastructure.  It allowed that one could legally bomb a media station that
was being used criminally to incite persons to commit genocide (as did
Rwanda’s primary radio station), but drew the line in the present context
where the government-directed propaganda did not itself meet the require-
ments for incitement but instead involves “merely disseminating propaganda
to generate support for the war effort.” See ICTY NATO Report, supra note
162, para. 47.
172. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv).  The “clearly
excessive” language of the Rome Statute standard may set a higher bar for
proportionality-based charges, but much will depend, of course, on exactly
how this standard is interpreted and applied.
173. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(vii), (xiii), (xxi).
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particular act is an international crime.”174  Perhaps hesitant
to present the issue so forthrightly, U.S. public statements op-
posing the Court have repeatedly focused on a hypothetical
scenario in which U.S. peacekeeping troops serving in a coun-
try that has ratified the Rome Statute become subject to the
investigations and indictments of a rogue Prosecutor, notwith-
standing the United States’ own refusal to join the treaty.175
Or the case is presented that the United States may hit a civil-
ian target in error and have its judgment second-guessed by
the Prosecutor and Court.176  These concerns might seem far-
fetched:  The majority of war crimes listed in the Rome Statute
can only become subject to prosecution “when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes”177 and the complementarity regime ensures
that the United States will in any case always have the first op-
portunity to investigate and prosecute any actual offenses.
But the allegations at issue in the Kosovo scenario are not
the kind committed by rank and file peacekeeping troops act-
ing of their own accord.  NATO bombing targets were author-
ized on the basis of consensus decisions following careful re-
view by the highest-level military and government officials of
each of the individual NATO states.178  In his memoir of the
campaign, General Wesley Clark, then Supreme Allied Com-
mander for Europe, describes how the targets he selected were
taken to the White House for examination and approval and
how, specifically, it was “difficult to get political approval for
striking the television stations, because strikes on television fa-
cilities seemed undemocratic and perhaps illegal.”179  If the
ICC Prosecutor were to second-guess such a high-level tactical
decision, it would not be hard to establish that the actions
formed part of a “plan or policy” and criminal liability in that
instance would go straight to the top.  Nor would it require a
“rogue” or politically motivated Prosecutor to pursue that
path:  A Prosecutor embracing a particular view of the law and
of prosecutorial duties might perceive a legal obligation to
174. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 95 (2003).
175. Scheffer, supra note 21.
176. Id.
177. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(1). R
178. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR 114-15 (2001).
179. Id. at 249.
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pursue prosecutions.  Thus, this example presents a concrete
scenario in which the heads of state of every NATO country
might be charged with war crimes in the event that a Prosecu-
tor disagreed with them about the legitimacy of the objective
underlying a particular tactical decision.  Indeed, one group of
law professors who urged the ICTY to prosecute NATO offi-
cials accused “all the prime ministers, presidents, foreign and
defense ministers of the NATO countries, and various officials
of NATO itself, that is to say Clinton, Albright, Cohen, Blair,
Chretien etc., down through Javier Solana, Wesley Clark, and
Jamie Shea.”180
Of course, the mere fact that the laws of war apply equally
to leaders of powerful states and to rogue dictators cannot be
reason itself to oppose the ICC.  The very idea of establishing
international laws to regulate the conduct of warfare necessi-
tates their universality—a fact not lost on Justice Jackson when,
during his opening speech at Nuremberg, he emphasized that
“while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the
law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must con-
demn aggression by any other nations, including those which
sit here now in judgment.”181  But the question here is a quali-
tative one:  Should the same mechanisms used to bring to jus-
tice genocidal murderers also apply to the prosecution of acts
for which there is greater legal and moral ambiguity?
The ICC Prosecutor might approach this question in dif-
ferent ways.  For example, one could treat the decision as a
question of gravity and argue that the crime, if any, perpe-
trated in NATO’s humanitarian intervention is simply not seri-
ous enough to command the attention of the ICC.  Interest-
ingly, this was not the approach adopted by the ICTY commit-
tee that looked into NATO’s actions.  Although the report
noted that “[t]he ICTY has jurisdiction over serious violations
of international humanitarian law as specified in articles 2-5 of
the Statute,”182 it did not analyze seriousness as a considera-
tion independent of the underlying crimes themselves.  The
Rome Statute, by contrast, specifies “sufficient gravity” as a sep-
arate admissibility requirement, thus suggesting a clearer dis-
180. Mandel, supra note 165, at 95.
181. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 154 (1954).
182. ICTY NATO Report, supra note 162, para. 31 (emphasis added).
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tinction between substantive crimes and the seriousness of the
offense.183  But the concept of gravity is not defined, and it
remains to be seen how the ICC Prosecutor, and ultimately the
ICC judges, will construe this mandate.
Another approach is to apply deferential standards that
recognize the difficulty of the underlying legal determinations
and the institutional limitations of a court asked to second-
guess military judgments.  Assessing which targets are legiti-
mate and what level of collateral civilian casualties are propor-
tional to a legitimate military goal requires a complex balanc-
ing that a court may be ill-suited to conduct.  Thus, a Prosecu-
tor might abstain from pursuing such cases unless the
unambiguous facts provide no conceivable legal justification
for the actions at issue.  This approach would have the further
benefit of promoting the ideal of legality—ridding unclear
laws of their retroactive character—and, by increasing predict-
ability, would diminish the disincentive that states fearful of
prosecution might have to engage in military interventions
motivated by worthy goals.  Arguably, this was the approach
adopted by the ICTY Prosecutor’s committee when it elected
to give credence to NATO’s factual explanation of its actions.
But this approach may not work as well when purely legal
questions are at issue.  For example, had NATO taken the view
that the anti-propagandistic rationale was sufficient to justify
its actions, no amount of deference to military judgment
would serve to stave off prosecution if the Prosecutor deter-
mined, as the committee suggested, that that rationale was in-
adequate.
Another way to look at this problem—or perhaps an addi-
tional reason to justify taking a strict view of grave crimes or
deferring to arguably reasonable decisions—is to consider
prosecutorial strategy in light of the broader political goals of
the ICC.  For example, the social benefits sought from the ex-
posure and condemnation of past crimes are less likely to be
realized if the truths revealed simply invite moral debate
rather than moral clarity.  In that instance, there is greater risk
that the extraordinary intervention of an international tribu-
nal will backfire by calling into question its own moral and po-
litical legitimacy.  In this way, the question of gravity becomes
similar to that of amnesty or exemplary prosecution:  In decid-
183. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d). R
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ing whether or not the Court’s powers should be activated, the
ICC Prosecutor must bring to bear extra-legal considerations
that go to the very heart of the ICC’s political goals.
In a recent communication justifying his decision not to
initiate an investigation into detainee abuse by British troops
in Iraq, Moreno-Ocampo has taken a first step toward estab-
lishing a practice in this area.  Although the Prosecutor ques-
tioned whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that
the alleged war crimes flowed from a “plan or policy” as re-
quired by the Rome Statute, he also argued that even if there
were a reasonable basis to believe that crime within the Court’s
jurisdiction had occurred, the number of potential victims (be-
tween four and twelve willfully killed and fewer than twenty
subjected to inhumane treatment), was insufficient to trigger
the Rome Statute’s gravity requirement, particularly when
compared with the scale of atrocities at issue in the Court’s
investigations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Sudan.184  Although this numbers-focused reasoning
leaves open many questions and is sure to draw criticism, it
suggests a current reluctance to expand the Court’s energies
beyond the contexts of mass atrocity that have given rise to
international tribunals in the past, even if that role is a nar-
rower one than what the text of the Rome Statute could rea-
sonably be read to authorize.
D. Timing
Thus far, I have considered the issue of prosecutorial dis-
cretion as one of whether to investigate and prosecute.  A dis-
tinct subset of discretionary issues arise with respect to the tim-
ing of indictments.  In contrast to the Nuremberg paradigm,
the “ex ante” nature of the ICC allows the Court to undertake
indictments at a time when conflicts are ongoing, thus raising
more acutely the question of what effect the prosecutorial pro-
cess may have on efforts to end violent conflicts and achieve
peace.185  This prospect also raises questions about the opera-
tion of the Court’s complementarity regime.  Is it meaningful
184. Communication from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Inter-
national Criminal Court (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/
OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.
185. See, e.g., Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 84 at 385 (observing that
“[i]n these circumstances, other authoritative political entities are still en-
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to limit the Court’s reach to cases in which a state is “unable or
unwilling genuinely” to investigate or prosecute if the Prosecu-
tor is to seek indictments at times of conflict when states are
highly unlikely to be both willing and able to pursue prosecu-
tions?  Perhaps more significantly, to the extent that the ICC
Prosecutor might, in theory, defer to a state’s decision to pur-
sue a nonprosecutorial approach to past crimes, is that possi-
bility meaningful if the Prosecutor is to seek indictments
before a state reaches the historical moment when it becomes
able to implement a transitional justice policy?
The debate on timing tends to focus on two interrelated
concerns.  First, is it possible that pre-transitional indictments
will hinder justice and prolong conflict and suffering by pre-
cluding otherwise optimal political arrangements that might
involve peaceful transition to a more just society in exchange
for nonprosecutorial alternatives?186  Second, is it possible that
such indictments could have positive effects?  Might they deter
political actors from expediency when insistence on prosecu-
tion would ultimately prove preferable?  (This, of course, is the
flip-side of the question just posed.)  Or might they deter ex-
isting or prospective war criminals engaged in the conflict
from future crimes—in other words, could early indictment
provide a sort of conflict-specific deterrence that is distinct
from the goal of general international deterrence?187
History offers little empirical evidence to answer these
questions, and existing cases caution against easy generaliza-
tions.  The experience of the ICTY has given rise to two in-
stances in particular which provoked debate about the timing
of charging decisions:  the indictments of self-styled Bosnian
Serb President Radovan Karadz˘ic´ and General Ratko Mladic´ in
1995 a few months prior to the Dayton peace negotiations,
and the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milos˘evic´
in 1999 during NATO’s Operation Allied Force.
Although some U.S. and European diplomats worried
that the indictments would hinder peace negotiations in Bos-
gaged in reestablishing order and the ex ante tribunal’s various options for
decision may influence these political and often military actions”).
186. See, e.g., id; Danner supra note 7 at 544-45; BASS, supra note 11, at 229- R
30.
187. See, e.g, Danner supra note 7, at 544-45; GOLDSTONE, supra note 94, at R
103, 126.
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nia,188 then-ICTY Chief Prosecutor Justice Richard Goldstone
has argued that the action was essential to peace because
Karadz˘ic´ and Mladic´’s subsequent exclusion from the negotia-
tion of the historic Dayton peace accord facilitated the partici-
pation of Bosnia’s Muslim-led government in those talks.189
Closer examination of these events, however, fails to yield
clear answers.  Taking Goldstone’s account on its own terms—
that indictment yielded exclusion from diplomatic negotia-
tions—any political success resulting from the Karadz˘ic´ and
Mladic´ indictments is highly contingent and anecdotal.  After
all, the head negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs at Dayton was
none other than Serbia’s Slobodan Milos˘evic´, who would later
find himself on trial at the ICTY for acts of genocide and
crimes against humanity, many committed prior to Dayton.
Croatian President Franjo Tudman negotiated on behalf of
both Croatia and the Bosnian Croat leadership, and provided
the international community with an essential, if not wholly
welcome, ally in opposing Milos˘evic´.190  But he too has been
accused of war crimes and effectively received a posthumous
indictment when the ICTY charged a Croatian general with
having participated in a joint criminal enterprise with
Tudman.191  If Goldstone were right about the effect of his in-
dictment, then the lesson would be an odd one:  Peace in Bos-
nia resulted not from a general policy of early indictment but
from the peculiar fact that the negotiations took place after
the indictment of Karadz˘ic´ and Mladic´, but before Milos˘evic´ or
Tudman faced similar charges.  Moreover, the underlying as-
sumption rests upon a dubious moral distinction:  that the in-
188. BASS, supra note 11, at 230.
189. Justice Richard Goldstone, The United Nations’ War Crimes Tribunals:
An Assessment, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 227, 233 (1997) (claiming that “without
the indictment of Dr. Karad_ic and General Mladic, there would have been
no Dayton Agreement”); GOLDSTONE, supra note 94, at 126.  For a detailed
account of the Dayton peace process viewed from the perspective of the
United States’ chief negotiator, see RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR
(1998).
190. BASS, supra note 11, at 229 (noting obstacles to gathering evidence
against Tudman in 1995 including the fact that “Bosnia was somewhat cir-
cumspect in its accusations against Croatia, realizing that Croatian support
was needed to balance against the Serb forces”).
191. The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-
01-45, Amended Indictment (Feb. 19, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/in-
dictment/english/got-ai040224e.htm.
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ternational community should refuse negotiation with in-
dicted war criminals while continuing to deal with known (and
arguably worse) criminals who have not faced the formality of
indictment.
The more plausible historical reading is that the timing of
the Karadz˘ic´ and Mladic´ indictments had little, if any, effect
upon the resolution of the Bosnian conflict as the marginaliza-
tion of the Bosnian Serbs resulted not from legal formalities,
but from political calculation.  As Bass has noted, the “real
point” in the U.S. strategy “was not the indictments, but the
fact that the White House increasingly saw Karadz˘ic´ and
Mladic´ as useless interlocutors, unlike Milos˘evic´.”192  Nor is
there any evidence, before or after these indictments, that the
most critical actors in the international community saw am-
nesty for Karadz˘ic´ or Mladic´ as an effective or realistic strategy
for achieving peace.
The indictment of Milos˘evic´, four years later, in the mid-
dle of NATO’s military intervention in Serbia—the first ever
international indictment of a sitting head of state—provoked
similar concerns that the action might inhibit peace negotia-
tions.193  But Milos˘evic´ later agreed to a cease-fire that in-
cluded U.N. governance of Kosovo, backed by NATO troops
and contained no promise of amnesty for him.  Milos˘evic´ ap-
parently realized that an ICTY indictment had little meaning
for his hold on power unless he was first removed by interna-
tional intervention or domestic effort, and it is unlikely that
any deterrent threat arising from those prospects would be
much amplified by the formal existence of an ICTY indict-
ment.  As it turned out, it took both a domestic revolution and
extraordinary international pressure to deliver Milos˘evic´ to
The Hague.194
192. BASS, supra note 11, at 232.
193. Id. at 274 (noting that “America and Britain publicly cheered the in-
dictments while American officials privately fretted that they would derail
cease-fire negotiations.  Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia’s envoy on Kosovo,
complained that a new obstacle had been put up.  How could the great pow-
ers negotiate with indicted war criminals.”).
194. See BASS, supra note 11, at 271-75; Goldsmith, supra note 174, at 93 R
(“[I]t was U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial might.  U.S. military and
diplomatic power ousted Milos˘evic’s and other unattractive regimes in the
Balkans, making a trial of Balkan leaders a possibility.  And it was the United
States’ threat to withhold a half-billion dollars in U.S. and International
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As with the Karadz˘ic´ and Mladic´ indictments, there is no
evidence that the Milos˘evic indictment scuttled any realistic ef-
fort to trade amnesty for peace, and it is unclear whether it
would have deterred international political actors from follow-
ing that route had it looked otherwise attractive.  It is possible
to imagine that international indictment may frustrate am-
nesty deals.  Although international tribunals cannot force po-
litical actors to enforce their edicts, the existence of indict-
ments may nevertheless impact public opinion and political
thinking in ways that make otherwise appealing amnesty deals,
whether formal or de facto, less palatable.  One could argue,
however, that this is a good thing.  Even those willing to pro-
mote amnesty in specific contexts must recognize that doing
so involves a tradeoff.  Indictments issued during ongoing con-
flicts may serve to highlight the nature of this tradeoff, encour-
aging political actors and the publics to which they are ac-
countable to consider more deeply whether moral considera-
tions truly justify forsaking prosecution in particular instances.
Of course, the very prospect of existing indictments giving
way to subsequent amnesty deals raises a concrete question of
prosecutorial policy:  If circumstances might otherwise justify
deferring prosecution, should the Prosecutor distinguish be-
tween indictments already issued and those that are merely
pending or potential?  The most interesting aspect of the ICTY
precedents may be less what they show about the empirical po-
litical effect of indictment than what they reveal about
prosecutorial attitudes.  Goldstone not only lobbied states to
comply with ICTY indictments, he also lobbied the brokers of
the Dayton Agreement not to trade in amnesties (and received
assurances they would not) or otherwise reach settlements that
would interfere with the ICTY’s mission.195  Arbour has admit-
ted to using the Milos˘evic´ indictment to attempt to dissuade
the international community from reaching an amnesty deal:
“I was in a hurry,” she explained in an interview with The New
Monetary Fund (IMF) aid to the successor regime in Yugoslavia that led to
Milos˘evic ’s actual transfer to the ICTY.”).
195. BASS, supra note 11, at 243-45.  As Bass notes, deputy prosecutor Gra-
ham Blewitt has even stated that the ICTY OTP specifically timed the release
of some additional indictments to coincide with the start of the Dayton talks
as part of an effort “to make sure that we were going to be a part of the
Dayton solution.” Id. at 244.  Goldstone, however, remembers the coinci-
dental timing as pure “happenstance.” Id.
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York Times, “I thought we might miss out as peace was being
discussed. I thought he might be able to negotiate a deal for
his departure.”196  The official press release accompanying
that indictment struck a similar note:  Arbour offered that she
was “mindful of the impact that this indictment may have on
the peace process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” but
expressed confidence that “the product of our work will make
a major contribution to a lasting peace, not only in Kosovo,
but in the whole region in which we have jurisdiction” and
that “no credible, lasting peace can be built upon impunity
and injustice.”197  Arbour then communicated additional polit-
ical advice to the international community, stating that with
respect to Milos˘evic´ and other suspects indicted with him that
“the evidence upon which this indictment was confirmed
raises serious questions about their suitability to be the guaran-
tors of any deal, let alone a peace agreement.”198
In adopting this stance, the ICTY’s prosecutors could and
did claim to be acting according to a specific political man-
date:  The U.N. Security Council had deemed the operation of
the ICTY necessary to “international peace and security” and
had created the tribunal to that end.199  But the same body
that had created the ICTY was also capable of changing its
mandate or taking a different course of action.  Any agree-
ment on a Yugoslavia amnesty deal would also presumably
have required the support of a Security Council resolution,
and that resolution would similarly have defended this course
of action based on Chapter VII considerations of international
peace and security.  The ICTY’s experience thus suggests a
fine line between following a mandate and taking action to
preserve and extend that mandate to the exclusion of other
196. Marlise Simons, Proud but Concerned: Tribunal Prosecutor Leaves, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1999, at A3. See also Danner, supra note 7, at 544. R
197. See Press Release, Statement by Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor
ICTY, JL/PIU/404-E (May 27, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/p404-e.htm [hereinafter Arbour].
198. Id.
199. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/808 (1993) (establishing the ICTY).  Arbour’s press release announc-
ing the Milos˘evic  indictment spoke of the Security Council as confident in
“creating this Tribunal and in calling upon it several times in the last year to
address this [war crimes] issue.”  Arbour, supra note 197.
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potential mandates that might replace or modify the original
one.
The ICC Prosecutor has thus far taken no formal position
on these matters, although all of the ICC’s three ongoing in-
vestigations are taking place in the midst of ongoing conflicts.
Ultimately, it remains an unresolved empirical question
whether the timing of indictments will have much conse-
quence for the ICC’s mission, but historical experience in this
area reveals a degree to which international prosecutors have
themselves assumed a self-consciously political role in the ad-
ministration of international criminal justice.
E. Multilateral Prosecutions and Disproportionate Crimes
The questions already discussed pose unique difficulties
for the mission of international criminal tribunals in situations
where the Prosecutor must consider alleged crimes perpe-
trated by opposing parties to a conflict.  The “victor’s justice”
of the Nuremberg process ensured that only Axis crimes would
be investigated and prosecuted.  The story told by the Nurem-
berg process was thus a relatively straightforward one of Nazi
aggression and criminality which required no consideration or
evaluation of Allied acts during the war.  This selectivity—inev-
itable in light of the political context giving rise to the tribu-
nal—provided for a straightforward pedagogical mission
aimed at condemning Nazi aggression and atrocities.
The wars fought in Croatia and Bosnia between 1991 and
1995 once again provide an instructive example of the chal-
lenges faced in attempting to establish a more equitable tribu-
nal, both because ICTY prosecutions have included crimes
committed by all three sides to those conflicts, and also be-
cause of the disproportionate distribution of major criminal
acts among the parties to the conflict with the great majority of
serious crimes having been committed by Serb forces.200  In
deciding upon the few suspects whom it could select for prose-
cution, the ICTY Prosecutors faced not merely the vertical
question of whether to focus on top leaders or to pursue some
200. Separate assessments by a U.N. Commission of Experts and the CIA
estimated that roughly ninety percent of crimes in Bosnia were committed
by Serb forces.  Florence Hartmann, Bosnia, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 50, 56, (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999), availa-
ble at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/bosnia.html.
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other method of selection, but also the horizontal question of
whether and how to take account of the distribution of crimes
among the parties to the conflict.
Underlying this question is the broader issue of the ICC’s
symbolic goals.  If prosecution of the select few is inherently
tokenistic, then what is this symbolic process supposed to sym-
bolize?  Ironically, although international criminal tribunals
are often said to promote the principle of individual guilt, the
mere prosecution of those individually guilty of particular acts
is unlikely to advance the political goals of international crimi-
nal tribunals unless the trials can also speak to broader griev-
ances rooted in collective responsiblity.201  Should the ICTY
have indicted equal numbers of high-level Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims, regardless of the resulting imbalance in the gravity of
the underlying offenses?  It seems unlikely that Croats and
Muslims would perceive much legitimacy in a justice process
which did not in some real sense reflect the asymmetry of eth-
nic cleansing and the unique role played by Serbian nationalis-
tic aggression in starting and perpetuating the Balkan wars.
Alternately, one might imagine a policy which empha-
sized the gravity of crimes without regard to broader political
sensitivities.  Had the ICTY pursued that approach, it is con-
ceivable that it would have expended its limited resources
prosecuting Serb-perpetrated offenses such as the genocide at
Srebrenica and other atrocities, without ever reaching Croat
and Muslim crimes that, while often hideously grim, were not
as large-scale or, at least in the apparent case of the Bosnian
Government, did not involve the same degree of high-level
sponsorship and planning.202  (Although it is broadly rooted
in fact, I state this scenario as a hypothetical; I am not claiming
that reliance on gravity considerations alone would have pre-
cluded non-Serb prosecutions at the ICTY.)  But that outcome
would also have been deeply unfortunate, however fair-
201. For a related meditation on the role of collective responsibility in
international criminal law, see George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals
and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
202. For a general account of the Bosnian conflict which covers these
events, see ALAN LITTLE & LAURA SILBER, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA 226-83
(1995).  On the Srebrenica massacre specifically, see DAVID ROHDE, ENDG-
AME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE’S WORST MASSACRE
SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997); JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBREN-
ICA:  RECORD OF A WAR CRIME (1996).
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minded the principles that produced it.  Not only would it
have seriously deprived the tribunal of credibility among
Serbs, it also would have encouraged Croats and Muslims to
sweep their own crimes under the rug, thus preventing those
societies from coming to terms with evils committed in their
names and possibility strengthening chauvinistic forces within
those communities.
Looking at the actual indictment practices of the ICTY
Prosecutor’s office, one cannot help but perceive some rough
attempt to strike a balance between these extremes via a
prosecutorial selection process designed to achieve the great-
est amount of public legitimacy.  As might be expected, the
lion’s share of indictments arising out of the Bosnian conflict
have targeted Serb offenders, followed by a much smaller
number of Croats and only a handful of Muslims.203  Agree or
disagree with the ICTY’s specific indictment choices, it is diffi-
cult to imagine the ICTY Prosecutor devising an acceptable in-
dictment policy without making some related judgments about
the broader political context of the former Yugoslav conflict.
Thus, far from simply operating as a legal actor who focuses on
neutral legal facts, the Prosecutor becomes, by virtue of the
indictment selection process, the teller of a broader, and likely
contested, political narrative.
The demand for tribunals to tell collective truths rather
than merely individual ones will complicate the work of any
international criminal prosecution, whether the ICC Prosecu-
tor has initiated investigations independently or whether the
Security Council has created a specific ad hoc tribunal de-
signed to address one historical context only.  One can imag-
ine historical situations (perhaps the Israel-Palestinian con-
flict), where the perception of collective rights and broad his-
torical injustices may be so deep and complex that atomistic
prosecutions of particular individuals for individual crimes will
have little value outside the context of a broader political reso-
lution that can make sense of the transitional justice process.
Although these factors may not make the job of international
prosecutors any easier when an international tribunal has
been called to prosecute crimes that local actors have gener-
ally proved unwilling to address, they do provide additional
reasons why prosecutorial policies reached according to politi-
203. See http://www.un.org/icty.
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cal settlements—including decisions to confer amnesty, to un-
dertake limited exemplary prosecutions while employing a
truth commission to address most crimes, and to narrow the
context and scope of investigations—may sometimes com-
mand greater respect than policies imposed independently by
an international prosecutor.
V. DISCRETION AND LEGITIMACY
The issues I have just discussed all pose difficult substan-
tive policy questions for those seeking to impose accountability
on perpetrators of international crimes.  In the context of the
ICC, however, they also raise a distinct set of institutional
problems.  From one perspective, the issue may be viewed as
the familiar administrative problem of delegation.  The Rome
Statute entrusts the ICC Prosecutor with the prosecution of
international crimes, but provides insufficient guidance on se-
lecting cases for prosecution.  This leaves open the risk of arbi-
trary prosecutions and raises the general question of whether a
Prosecutor’s policymaking functions bear sufficient legal ac-
countability.
At a deeper level, however, the problem of prosecutorial
discretion raises a more fundamental separation of powers
question.  One need not develop a comprehensive theory of
legitimacy to perceive the problem.  If the decision to prose-
cute depends on deeply political questions that require com-
plex policy judgments about what form of transitional justice is
best suited to a particular situation, then the very rationale for
delegating this decision to an independent Prosecutor is un-
dermined.204  Can a single official’s discretion possibly provide
204. This point is one often overlooked even by those who do focus on the
substantive policy dilemmas facing the ICC Prosecutor.  One author, for ex-
ample, argues that because prosecutorial discretion “is the cornerstone of
prosecutorial independence” and is “needed to insulate the prosecutor from
political interests and promote impartiality and independence,” the ICC
Prosecutor is therefore appropriately entrusted (subject only to pragmatic
constraints) with deciding such thorny questions as whether a particular am-
nesty law deserves deference. See Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71, 76 (2004).
The problem, of course, is that the value of “impartiality and independence”
from “political interests” takes on a different cast when the Prosecutor is
entrusted with policy decisions that, by their nature, resemble those typically
entrusted to political actors.
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an effective means of deciding these questions?  One might be
inclined to agree in a formal sense with Jack Goldsmith that
the ICC is indeed a “self-defeating” institution:205  The Court
centers on a prosecutorial mechanism that is incapable of
meeting the very standard of legitimacy that its advocates have
invoked to justify its existence.
For that reason, the existence of prosecutorial authority
poses a far greater challenge to the mission of the ICC than
does, for example, the narrower debate over whether the
Rome Statute contains sufficient protections against bias or
prosecutorial abuse.  It should also come as little surprise,
therefore, that the dilemmas of transitional justice have fueled
the arguments of those who believe not merely that the ICC
should be improved, but that it should not exist at all.  For
example, whereas outgoing President Clinton grudgingly
signed the Rome Statute on behalf of the United States, after
having warned that its provisions created a risk of politicized
prosecution, upon taking office President Bush promptly with-
drew U.S. support,206 emphasizing both the previous adminis-
tration’s concerns and the deeper institutional critique that
there is no unitary solution to problems of transitional justice.
In this vein, the Bush administration has adopted the view
that, “[w]hen a society makes the transition from oppression
to democracy, their new government must face their collective
past.  The state should be allowed to choose the method.  The
government should decide whether to prosecute or seek na-
tional reconciliation.  This decision should not be made by the
ICC.”207
States, of course, are free to argue that the ICC should not
exist, and to take diplomatic actions to oppose its operation
and funding.  But that strategy is little help to the ICC itself,
which does exist, must interpret its mandate, and must make
do as best it can.  Are there strategies internal to the ICC itself
which may help alleviate the tensions of prosecutorial policy
and enhance the Court’s efficacy and institutional legitimacy?
In the remainder of this Article I consider and evaluate three
such proposals.  The first envisions the Prosecutor limiting his
own discretion by promulgating formal guidelines that will di-
205. See Goldsmith, supra note 174, at 89-101.
206. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. R
207. Grossman, supra note 8.
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rect his actions.  The second seeks a similar result, but does so
through legal interpretation of the Rome Statue itself.  In this
Part, I conclude that neither strategy is sufficient on its own
terms to address the underlying problem and that both risk
aggravating it.  In Part V, I propose a more promising strategy
of political deference by which the Prosecutor acknowledges
the political, extra-legal nature of the policy questions affect-
ing transitional justice initiatives and seeks external political
partners who are better suited to assist and evaluate states’ ef-
forts at transitional justice.  I consider various permutations of
this model and assess the strengths and weaknesses of each.
A. Ex Ante Guidelines
Several commentators have advocated a guidelines-based
approach to constraining prosecutorial discretion.  For exam-
ple, as participants in a process of expert consultations organ-
ized by the ICC Prosecutor, Avril McDonald and Roelof Have-
man urged the Prosecutor to “objectify” the use of
prosecutorial discretion, arguing that “it is of vital importance
that guidelines are developed—and made public—giving di-
rection to the decision either [to initiate] or not to initiate an
investigation.  ‘Vital’, as the danger looms large that the court
is accused of starting investigations on entirely arbitrary
grounds, and even based on political considerations.”208  Al-
lison Danner has attempted a more systematic defense of this
approach.  Arguing that prosecutorial guidelines rooted in
“good process” may “enhance” the legitimacy of the ICC Prose-
cutor, she proposes a regulated system of prosecutorial policy
based on publicly promulgated guidelines developed by the
Prosecutor and approved eventually by a vote of the Assembly
of States Parties.  This approach, argues Danner, will enhance
legitimacy by rooting the Prosecutor’s decisionmaking in neu-
tral ex ante criteria that “provid[e] for a transparent standard
that the Prosecutor will consistently apply.”209  It will also
avoid, in her view, the prospect of prosecutorial choice becom-
ing subject primarily to an informal sort of “pragmatic ac-
208. McDonald & Haveman, supra note 7, at 9; see also Ola´solo, supra note R
7, at 143-44 (arguing that “core policy choices” left unanswered by the Rome R
Statute should be addressed by amending the treaty or, “[a]s the second best
solution,” by amending the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.).
209. See Danner, supra note 7, at 552. R
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countability” to various actors “including states that are not
party to the treaty, and other actors such as NGOs.”210
There is an obvious appeal to this framework, but the
mere existence of public guidelines fails to address the core of
the dilemma.  There are two general sets of problems here.
One concerns the nature of the policy issues confronting the
ICC Prosecutor; the second concerns the lack of an appropri-
ate political framework to justify prosecutorial control over
these issues.
Because the guidelines argument focuses primarily on the
concern of actual or perceived arbitrariness, it relies on a kind
of a self-fulfilling prophecy:  By defining legitimacy as imparti-
ality it ensures that fixed prosecutorial guidelines will confer
an almost per se legitimacy as long as they provide decisional
rules which are honored in practice.  Drawing upon the work
of Abram and Antonia Chayes, Danner maintains that an inter-
national law norm may be regarded as “legitimate” if it “(1)
emanates from fair and accepted procedure, (2) is applied
equally and without invidious discrimination, and (3) does not
offend minimum standards of fairness and equity.”211  She em-
phasizes, therefore, that established guidelines can provide a
means by which the ICC Prosecutor may “ensure that he
reaches his decisions in a fair and nondiscriminatory way” and
“demonstrate that he adheres to good process in decision
making.”212  Danner does contemplate a somewhat broader
concept of legitimacy that encompasses not only “actual” legiti-
macy but also the “external perceptions of the Prosecutor’s le-
gitimacy.”213  But she limits this inquiry to the question of
210. 209Id. at 525.
211. Id. at 536 (citing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY 127 (1995)).
212. Id.
213. Id.  The centrality of perception figures in some standard definitions
of legitimacy.  In a discussion of legitimacy and international institutions Ju-
lian Ku has drawn from Robert Dahl’s formulation that “a government is
said to be ‘legitimate’ if the people to whom its orders are directed believe
that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of
government possess the quality of ‘rightness,’ propriety, or moral good-
ness—the right, in short, to make binding rules.”  Julian Ku, The Delegation of
Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 71, 126 (2000) (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 41 (2d ed. 1970)); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93
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whether the Prosecutor is perceived to follow a fair and neu-
tral process that satisfies her own, rather narrow, procedural
definition of “actual” legitimacy.214  Even from that perspec-
tive, moreover, one may doubt whether prosecutorial discre-
tion, or the ICC more broadly, can provide a “fair and ac-
cepted procedure” for resolving the thorniest political ques-
tions of transitional justice.215
The problem of prosecutorial discretion emerges not
merely from the absence of fixed guidance in the Rome Stat-
ute, but from the very nature of the questions at issue.  Guide-
lines developed to demonstrate the objectivity of prosecutorial
choices are of little assistance if the problems are not of the
sort themselves that can be effectively subjected to rule-based
decisionmaking.  It is instructive to note the gap here between,
on the one hand, the range of issues and considerations which
the literature identifies as properly subject to prosecutorial
guidelines and, on the other hand, the apparent inability to
supply concrete proposals for how these concerns could or
should be converted into ex ante decisional rules.  McDonald
and Haveman argue that the kinds of issues and guidelines
faced by domestic prosecutors “are almost entirely useless on
the supranational level of the ICC,”216 and they propose their
own, nonexclusive set of thirteen open-ended criteria that the
Prosecutor should consult.  These include such considerations
as “the level of public outrage,” “popular support for a particu-
lar investigation,” “security issues (whether conflict is ongo-
ing . . .),” “threats to the security of a fragile transitional state
AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999) (distinguishing between normative and popular
theories of legitimacy).
214. Danner, supra note 7 at 536. It is also worth noting here that Chayes
and Chayes do not endorse a strictly procedural view of legitimacy but ac-
knowledge that “the question of the legitimacy of a rule or a system cannot
be kept wholly distinct from the fairness of its substantive content.” ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 134 (1995).
215. Thomas Franck has similarly emphasized the importance of substan-
tive fairness to international law.  He writes that “[t]he fairness of interna-
tional law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first by the degree to
which the rules satisfy the participants’ expectations of justifiable distribu-
tion of costs and benefits, and secondly by the extent to which the rules are
made and applied in accordance with what the participants perceive as right
process.” THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS 7 (1995).
216. McDonald & Haveman, supra note 7, at 9. R
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by prosecuting key individuals,” and “political issues, including
the existence of a peace treaty amnesties (distinguish between
democratic and non-democratic societies/popular will and
conditional and unconditional).”217  The authors fail, how-
ever, to suggest any model for how these criteria can be “objec-
tified” into decisional rules that would specifically guide the
commencement of investigations and dictate when a state’s ef-
forts should receive deference and when they should not.  In-
stead, they advise that the matter is “not necessarily [one] of
making a straight-forward choice or of choosing between two
or several extremes.”218  Danner also sees a wide group of deci-
sions—including recognition of amnesties and truth commis-
sions in lieu of criminal trials—as open for resolution by
guidelines, and she too generally declines to offer much spe-
cific advice on what these guidelines should look like beyond
the fact that they should exist.219
This silence suggests the difficulty of establishing clear
rules to govern the context-specific question of what transi-
tional justice efforts undertaken by a particular society are suf-
ficiently sound to command deference.  Indeed, one may ask
whether ex ante rules are even desirable.  Danner sees it as
essential to the Court’s integrity that the Prosecutor act impar-
tially and treat “like cases alike.”220  But how well does that ap-
proach serve transitional societies themselves?  Nations grap-
pling with the dilemmas of transitional justice have created in-
dividualized legislative solutions after the fact to deal with
singular historical events involving mass atrocities.  South Af-
rica created the TRC specifically to deal with its history of
apartheid.  Rwanda promulgated a special genocide statute to
address the genocide of Tutsis in 1994.  These regimes created
special ex post rules to confront specific categories of crimes
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Danner, supra note 7, at 542-46.  In particular, Danner notes with R
respect to article 53’s exception for the “interests of justice” that “a prime
goal of the prosecutorial guidelines should be to give content to this nebu-
lous phrase.” Id. at 543.  However, beyond endorsing the general policy of
prioritizing high-level offenders of serious crimes, she does not suggest an-
swers to the critical question of how the Prosecutor should apply this lan-
guage to alternative justice proposals, ongoing conflicts, or other situations
in which prosecution might have adverse political effects. Id. at 542-46.
220. Id. at 537.
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committed in the context of defined historical events.  Their
operation did not hinge upon what actions other countries
may have adopted in response to similar events.  If a nation in
the future wishes to implement an amnesty-granting TRC,
should it be denied that opportunity simply because the ICC
decided to conduct prosecutions in some other country that
faced similar crimes?  And will the demonstrable neutrality of
the process really create perceived legitimacy if the outcome is
opposed by the societies most affected?221
One might argue that treating like cases alike is a com-
plex thing, and that once every situation is viewed in light of its
full context it is possible to reach the right result in each as
long as all appropriate criteria are considered.  But here we
face a tension.  The kind of guidelines that provide for mean-
ingful ex ante decisional rules likely to demonstrate the ICC
Prosecutor’s impartiality may not be the kind likely to embrace
the full complexity and contingency of each situation.  The
Prosecutor may therefore be stuck between the Scylla of ossi-
fied ex ante decisional rules that promote certainty at the risk
of substantive inadequacy and the Charybdis of open-ended
criteria that leave great flexibility for individual circumstances
but risk that the Prosecutor’s discretion may be no more
guided than if those criteria did not exist in the first place.
The second problem with the guidelines approach is its
indebtedness to a domestic administrative law model, which is
rooted in a democratic legitimacy that the ICC inherently
lacks.222  McDonald and Haveman as well as Danner draw sup-
port for their guidelines-based approach from the fact that
prosecutorial guidelines are a common feature of domestic
justice systems.223  But domestic prosecutors are internal to the
societies in which crimes have been committed and they are
221. For a related argument in the domestic context, see Green and
Zacharias, supra note 60, at 890 (“Decontextualized decision-making, at least R
in part, is inconsistent with the notion of public accountability.  If a prosecu-
tor ignores public expectations in an effort to avoid being swayed by
prejudice and irrational excesses, how can the prosecutor serve the public’s
will?  Public accountability presupposes some form of responsiveness to soci-
ety’s present-day desires.”).
222. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 213, at 599 (observing “democracy has
become the touchstone of legitimacy in the modern world”).
223. McDonald & Haveman, supra note 7, at 9; Danner, supra note 7, at R
541-42.
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accountable to the democratic process of those societies, thus
allowing an easier fit with standard notions of legitimacy.  This
basic link exists regardless of the precise mechanism used to
delegate or constrain prosecutorial decisionmaking.  In the
United States, for example, prosecutors are either directly
elected or are appointed by democratically accountable offi-
cials of the executive branch.  Their policies may therefore be
said to reflect those of executive officials entrusted with poli-
cymaking or of the populace itself.224  The bureaucratic judge-
driven model of civil law societies, by contrast, realizes demo-
cratic values through a greater degree of legislative supremacy.
And as previously emphasized, it is always possible that socie-
ties may seek specialized solutions to address singular historic
atrocities.
The ICC, by contrast, suffers from the same “democratic
deficit” that is typical of many international institutions.225
The selection of the Prosecutor on a one-state-one-vote ba-
sis226 takes place on an international plane that is divorced
from the democratic process and societal experience of the
224. Indeed, the executive nature of the prosecutorial role is one of the
standard rationales invoked by U.S. courts and commentators to justify the
exercise of broad prosecutorial discretion. See Krug, supra note 60 at 645-46; R
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001).
225. There is a wide literature dealing with problems of democratic legiti-
macy in international institutions.  For a summary with citations, see, e.g.,
Bodansky, supra note 2, at 597-98.  For some other  recent debates on this
topic, see, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Two World Orders, PROSPECT, Dec. 18, 2003;
Ann-Marie Slaughter, Opinion: A Dangerous Myth, PROSPECT, Jan. 22, 2004 (re-
sponding to Rubenfeld); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit:
How to Make International Institutions More Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 2
(2001).  On the democratic deficit of the ICC, see Madeleine Morris, Democ-
racy and Punishment: The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court,
5 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 591, 593 (2002).
226. Among other anomalies, the one-state-one-vote approach would
mean that, should the United States join the Court, it would have only one
out of ninety-nine prosecutorial votes, notwithstanding that the U.S. popula-
tion is greater than the population of seventy of the current State Parties
combined. See CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/index.html (follow “Guide to Rank Order Pages” hyperlink; then
follow “Population” hyperlink) (reporting international population data).
Of course, even amending the process to adjust for population does not re-
ally speak to the more fundamental tension between the Court’s legalistic
aspirations and the complexity of the dilemmas faced by transitional socie-
ties.
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individual state actually implementing a transitional justice
policy.  Thus, any framework for prosecutorial guidelines at
the ICC level must face the irreducible tension between the
policy priorities of the international institution on the one
hand, and those of the societies most directly affected by inter-
national crimes on the other.  As Danner notes, some form of
democratic deficit may be an inevitable feature of interna-
tional institutions,227 but that fact does not mean that the issue
should be ignored or that it does not inform which questions
may effectively and legitimately be addressed by international
institutions and which may not.228
The problem is particularly vexing in the present case as
the classic rationale for administrative delegation—that com-
plex problems should be entrusted to those with special exper-
tise to resolve them—does not apply.  Indeed, it is hard to im-
agine how a criminal prosecutor appointed ex ante by the As-
sembly of State Parties can stake some special claim to resolve
the types of policy dilemmas I have explored in this Article.
Nor does the Rome Statute appear to reflect the drafters’ con-
sidered judgment to the contrary.  Instead, the Court’s legalis-
tic design reflects the false assumption that such problems
have little or no legitimate impact on the prosecutorial func-
tion in the first instance.
In raising these concerns, I do not mean to suggest that
prosecutorial guidelines cannot, under any circumstances, en-
hance the ICC’s ability to address the kind of discretionary
choices that the Prosecutor will face.  But the focus should not
be on the existence of guidelines per se; the more pressing
issue is whether the content of prosecutorial policy can come
to terms with the legitimacy challenge posed by the substantive
dilemmas of prosecutorial discretion.  And we must also be re-
alistic about how far appropriate guidelines can narrow the
Prosecutor’s range of choices.
B. Interpreting the Rome Statute
Another line of thinking contemplates that interpretation
of the Rome Statute may resolve the most pressing questions
227. Danner, supra note 7, at 535. R
228. See, e.g., Nye, supra note 225, at 6 (arguing that “the more an institu-
tion deals with broad values, the more its democratic legitimacy becomes
relevant”).
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of prosecutorial discretion.229  Thus, for example, the Court’s
judges might announce a legal test to decide when the Prose-
cutor should decline proceeding with an otherwise admissible
case, if it would be in the “interests of justice.”230  Or the Court
might develop more specific standards to dictate whether cer-
tain types of proceedings—for instance a TRC-style amnesty
commission or a Rwandan-style plea bargaining regime—
count as a “genuine” domestic “trial” for admissibility pur-
poses.231
The judicial review provisions of the Rome Statute make
the prospect of such judicial intervention a real one.  Al-
though this approach would not eliminate all questions of
prosecutorial choice—resource limitations will inevitably limit
the number of suspects whom the Court can investigate and
prosecute—it could take some of the most political questions
out of the Prosecutor’s hands.  Still, it is hard to see how this
result solves the problem.  To the extent that neither the Stat-
ute, nor background principles of international law, clarify
how far transitional states must pursue criminal justice, judge-
imposed standards are unlikely to prove a more effective or
legitimate means of resolving the underlying policy questions
than is prosecutorial discretion.  The basic problem is the
same:  Either the Court will find itself relying on contested and
formalistic rules that fail to capture the complexity of individ-
ual cases, or the Court will rely on open-ended balancing tests
that effectively reserve for its judges the very kind of policy de-
cisions the Rome Statute was supposed to avoid.  Indeed, the
judicial model is probably a worse solution because it threat-
229. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 7.  Robinson argues that the “interests R
of justice” should be interpreted to exclude blanket amnesties, allow exem-
plary prosecutions as a matter of course, and permit reliance on nonp-
rosecutorial alternatives in extreme circumstances.  Id. See also Ronald C.
Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles
of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173,
245-47 (2002) (arguing that “accountable” amnesties should receive recogni-
tion).
230. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(c); Robinson, supra note 7, at R
483.
231. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17; Robinson, supra note 7; see also R
Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice
(2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf
(suggesting that “alternative forms of justice” may be treated within the ru-
bric of complementarity in addition to article 53).
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ens to convert policy questions into immutable norms that are
less subject to evolution or reconsideration.  At the very least,
it will shift policymaking away from prosecutors to judges who,
possessing even less claim to executive authority than prosecu-
tors, arguably are less institutionally competent to address
such questions.232
VI. THE POLITICAL DEFERENCE MODEL
I turn now to a third model for constraining political dis-
cretion, which I call the political deference model.  This
model contemplates a reconceived ICC, which begins from
the realization that the Rome Statute has neither solved the
problem of transitional justice nor resolved the role of interna-
tional courts in promoting that justice.  It maintains, moreo-
ver, that the only way for the ICC Prosecutor to act according
to ex ante decisional rules that enhance internal procedural
legitimacy, while still acknowledging the unresolved, political
nature of the choices underlying those decisions, is to cooper-
ate with political actors who are presumptively best suited to
address in context the adequacy of a state’s justice efforts.
Such a policy, of course, must come at a cost to the ideal
of an independent Prosecutor vigorously pursuing investiga-
tions in the face of political weakness, but it need not trans-
form the Court into a de facto ad hoc tribunal which overrides
the decisions of the Rome Conference and provides the
United States, through the exercise of discretion, what it could
not achieve in diplomatic negotiations.  A possible reconcilia-
tion between the demands of prosecutorial independence and
context-sensitivity offers itself in the following claims:  (1) that
the case for prosecutorial independence is greatest—and the
fear of political inaction most credible—during times of ongo-
ing crimes or when criminal regimes remain in power, and (2)
that both the need for and prospect of political guidance is
greatest when states undergo political transitions and seek to
develop their own policies for dealing with the past.  I consider
both these scenarios in greater detail below.
232. See Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal
Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 377 (2006) (discussing problems posed by judicial policy-
making at the ICC).
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A. Pre-Transitional Regimes
As previously detailed, some of the most difficult ques-
tions of prosecutorial discretion arise when transitional states
seek to provide some form of accountability for past crimes
that falls short of universal prosecution.233  But the question of
whether to defer to alternate or nonprosecutorial transitional
justice policies simply does not arise in the case where regimes
implicated in criminality retain power.  Such states are unlikely
to seek any form of justice for past crimes, and if they do, those
efforts are unlikely to command the minimal credibility neces-
sary to raise a legitimate claim to deference.  In that case, the
choice is effectively between ICC justice and no justice.
At the same time, it is also easy to see why ICC advocates
fear that crimes will be ignored—and impunity endorsed—if
the operation of international justice is solely committed to
political powers.  Although not as dramatic as military inter-
vention, the creation of a tribunal to try crimes committed by a
sitting regime can be a highly charged act requiring substan-
tial political commitment.  The states sitting on the Security
Council may not wish to upset a political ally, or they may fear
that a public commitment to war crimes prosecution will
merely call attention to their own failure to take more substan-
tial steps to end the violence.  Consider for example, the pains
the U.S. government took in 1994 not to refer to the Rwandan
genocide as such, out of fear that public endorsement of the
term would call attention to its obligation under the Genocide
Convention to “prevent” that crime.234
The authority of the ICC Prosecutor to initiate investiga-
tions and prosecutions in these scenarios is arguably the most
significant innovation of the ICC.  Although indictment alone
cannot remove the political obstacles to arrest and punish-
ment, it may serve an expressive role, providing a public re-
minder to the world of the obligations imposed by interna-
tional criminal law.  By giving the Prosecutor the independent
authority to launch investigations and seek indictments, the
233. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.
234. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE
OF GENOCIDE 358-64 (2003).  Of course, the opposite may also apply.  The
Security Council may cynically authorize prosecution in order to mask its
own failure to take stronger action necessary to end a conflict.
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Rome Statute ensures that this expressive function can apply
largely unrestrained by considerations of realpolitik.
The debate in this context focuses on the prospect that
pre-transitional indictments will not merely be symbolic but
may in fact impede transitions by foreclosing nonprosecutorial
alternatives that, on balance, might be the preferable means to
maximize the goals of both justice and peace.  I have already
discussed reasons why that fear may be overly speculative,235
but that fear, even if eventually justified, depends largely upon
how indictments are conceived.  This risk is greatest if ICC in-
dictments are understood to foreclose transitional options that
may materialize in the future.  But that need not be the case if
the Prosecutor’s policies leave open the possibility that specific
indictments might give way to other options if future develop-
ments justify that choice.  In that instance, indictment can con-
tinue to serve its symbolic role of highlighting a state’s failure
to pursue accountability without prejudging the eventual form
that that accountability will assume.
It may, of course, be the case that the symbolic effect of
ICC indictments will raise international attention to war
crimes and cause states to assign greater value to the prosecu-
tion of war crimes and to reflect that policy in their interna-
tional relations.  Indeed, that very hope is central to the ICC’s
mission:  In a world in which the Court is powerless to enforce
its own edicts, there is little more the institution can hope to
achieve.236  But fundamentally, the fact of an indictment does
not—and should not—change the basic policy considerations
that dictate how and whether the international community will
push for prosecutions in states that refuse compliance with the
ICC.
The practice of pre-transitional indictment during ongo-
ing conflicts also finds political precedent in the Security
Council’s past actions establishing the ICTY and referring
crimes in Darfur to the ICC.  The situation of the ICC Prosecu-
tor is actually rather similar to that of the Security Council in
this context.  It may well be that contingent considerations
cause a later reassessment of how and to what degree justice
235. See supra Part III.D.
236. The question of whether, and to what extent, international law and
institutions constrain the actions of political actors remains, of course, a cen-
tral point of debate in international legal and political theory.
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should be pursued, but that point applies equally whether or
not it is the ICC Prosecutor or Security Council that authorizes
a criminal investigation.  In short, neither actor can tell the
future.  On balance then, the practice of pre-transitional inves-
tigation and indictment seems preferable to abdication of
prosecutorial independence based on sheer speculation that
indictment might affect transitional possibilities which them-
selves may never materialize, may proceed on the basis of his-
torical events having nothing to do with the existence of an
indictment, or may in fact be aided by symbolic effects of an
indictment.
At the same time, the ICC does have a clear institutional
interest in pursuing indictments that are compelling beyond
their symbolic importance.  However provisional or incom-
plete an ICC indictment may be in theory, the integrity of the
institution will be best served if there is a correspondence be-
tween those whom the ICC indicts and those who most likely
should be prosecuted as a matter of good policy and political
consensus.  Given, in particular, the ICC’s lack of meaningful
democratic accountability (or even an adequate theory of what
such accountability would look like), the Prosecutor will be on
the surest footing when focusing on cases that involve unam-
biguous evils that are universally recognizable as such.  To the
extent that this approach itself invites ambiguity, the Prosecu-
tor can look to past precedents of ad hoc tribunals for gui-
dance as to the kind of pervasive atrocities that have attracted
international justice measures.  The focus of the ICC should
be on the clearest cases, not on breaking new legal ground.
This rationale for requiring a high moral threshold relies
on a perpetrator-neutral logic:  It matters not whether the
guilty are citizens of a neglected African nation, or the leader-
ship of a powerful Western democracy.  At the same time, how-
ever, there is a more calculating logic to limiting the contex-
tual reach of the ICC, based in the broad recognition that the
ICC will rise or fall on the political support of the interna-
tional community.  An institutional focus on the most serious,
systematic atrocities would provide a perpetrator-neutral
method of defining the ICC’s mission in ways calculated to
achieve political consensus where possible while minimizing
the perceived threat of prosecutorial overreaching among the
most politically and economically stable states who are most
critical to the ICC’s future.  While this solution may not please
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those who desire the broadest application of the rules of war
by an international criminal tribunal, a more focused ICC is
preferable to an expansive but ineffectual one.
B. Transitional Regimes
The risk that prosecutorial restraint will give free reign to
political apathy and ulterior motives does not disappear once
transitional regimes take root, but several countervailing con-
siderations urge a policy of political deference in this context.
Unlike pre-transitional states, transitional states are presump-
tively more likely to pursue transitional justice policies that re-
present a good faith balance between the backward-looking
justice of criminal accountability and the forward-looking
goals of social reconciliation and constructing a more just soci-
ety.  The Rome Statute, meanwhile, sets forth no mechanism
for assessing the merits of such policies vis-a`-vis the Prosecu-
tor’s own assessment of how much, if any, exemplary prosecu-
tion is necessary.  In addition, to the extent that transitional
states are genuinely interested in achieving justice, and to the
extent that they are more likely to seek participation in and
assistance from the international community, the prospect of
cooperative engagement with the international community
also becomes more likely.
I consider here two frameworks for how the Prosecutor
may defer to political actors in these circumstances.
1. Explicit Deference
One option is for the ICC Prosecutor to explicitly defer to
the decisionmaking authority of political actors.  There are
several forms this deference might take.  The Prosecutor
might, for example, rely on regional organizations like NATO
or the African Union.  Or he might seek indicators that partic-
ular transitional governments have sufficient credibility and le-
gitimacy to be entrusted with pursuing their own transitional
policies.  The most promising policy from this perspective,
however, is to seek the engagement of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, whose mandate under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
protect international peace and security has extended in re-
cent years to the creation of international criminal tribunals,
as well as to other questions of nation-building and peacekeep-
ing.  According to this approach the Prosecutor would affirma-
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tively invite the Council to issue resolutions addressing the ad-
equacy of a state’s transitional justice policies and providing
guidance as to what role, if any, ICC investigation should play
in ensuring the accountability of those efforts.  This approach
would, in turn, give states an incentive to engage the Security
Council, whose oversight could also help states develop poli-
cies adequate to command some measure of international po-
litical approval.  Although the result in some circumstances
might be to drop existing indictments of unprosecuted per-
sons whom the ICC had investigated during the pre-transi-
tional period, the converse scenario is also, and perhaps even
more, likely.  A determination that a state’s prosecution of
only a few top leaders was inadequate under the circumstances
would justify further ICC investigation and prosecution be-
yond the state’s own cut-off.
In a formal sense, the prospect of such cooperation be-
tween the Prosecutor and Security Council already exists
within the provisions of the Rome Statute.  Article 13 autho-
rizes the Security Council to refer cases to the Prosecutor
whereas article 16 permits the Security Council to defer inves-
tigations for a year at a time.  And here, one may anticipate a
concern:  If a requirement of affirmative Security Council re-
ferral were too unreliable to command the agreement of the
like-minded delegates to the Rome Conference, and the ex-
isting safeguard of article 16 was too weak to satisfy the United
States, how can the prospect of Chapter VII action hope to
resolve the tension underlying the fundamental dispute over
prosecutorial authority?
Without attempting to minimize the risks of reliance on
Chapter VII, I believe the greatest issue may be attitudinal.  As
written, article 16 has the character of a temporary emergency
measure that views Security Council involvement as a kind of
extraordinary intervention in the Court’s work.  Security
Council members sympathetic to the Court have already re-
fused (after twice granting) the attempt of the United States to
secure annual prospective deferrals of any and all investiga-
tions of U.N. peacekeepers deployed overseas.237  The demand
for that kind of blanket speculative deferral is very different
from one targeted at the specifics of an actual situation that
could generate the Court’s involvement, but one can imagine
237. See Kirgis, supra note 4. R
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\39-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 84 21-MAR-07 11:17
666 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 39:583
these states exhibiting similar reluctance to employ article 16
in circumstances where such action would be viewed as under-
mining the Court.  Transitional states, meanwhile, can place
little reliance in a temporary measure that requires annual re-
newal with the assent of all Permanent Members of the Coun-
cil.
The picture changes, however, if Security Council involve-
ment is viewed not as interference in the Court’s work, but as a
welcome measure necessary to define and legitimize the
Court’s incomplete mandate.  By deferring to Security Council
guidance as a matter of internal policy, and by doing so at
times when states themselves are undertaking efforts to ad-
dress past crimes, the Prosecutor may be able to help moder-
ate the political friction that otherwise complicates Security
Council referrals.  And one must recall here that the Security
Council has often proven more willing to exercise its authority
in transitional contexts than in times of ongoing conflict:
Whereas the Council was unable to agree on measures author-
izing either the Kosovo intervention or the recent Iraq war, in
both cases it proved itself able to authorize the post-war na-
tion-building efforts.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the Prosecutor will
in fact welcome such participation.  Former ICTY Prosecutor
Louise Arbour has argued, for example, that “[t]he greatest
threat, in my view, to the legitimacy of the permanent Court,
would be the credible suggestion of political manipulation of
the Office of the Prosecutor, or of the Court itself, for political
expediency.”238  If international prosecutors are to reject reli-
ance on political decision makers as “political manipulation,”
the kind of constructive relationship I have contemplated will
be difficult to achieve.
A different concern focuses not on the reliability of Secur-
ity Council action, but on its desirability.  If the ICC Prosecu-
tor is not an ideal arbiter of the adequacy of transitional justice
measures, is the Security Council any better?239  The creators
238. Arbour, supra note 90, at 3. R
239. See Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of
Collective Security after the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201, 246-69
(1994); Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Deci-
sion Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 516 (1991); see also
Bodansky, supra note 213. R
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of the U.N. designed the Security Council to reflect the reali-
ties of international power (as they existed as the end of World
War II no less), not democratic principles or liberal values.
Why should the particular states comprising the Council at any
given time—and in particular the five veto-wielding perma-
nent members—get to decide how countries go about the bus-
iness of transitional justice?
There are two responses here.  One argument admits that
the Security Council is a flawed vehicle but argues that it is,
nevertheless, the best we have.  If one accepts—as both the
Rome Statute and past Security Council precedents affirm—
that serious violations of international criminal law are matters
of international concern which cannot be entrusted solely to
individual states, then one must ask how best to give effect to
this international concern.  The Security Council, whatever its
underlying flaws, at least has the advantage of being a political
body entrusted with imposing post hoc policy solutions that
carry legal legitimacy under the U.N. Charter.  It may in this
respect claim to be a superior arbiter of transitional justice pol-
icy than a judicial institution or international prosecutor
charged with applying the law.  The second response is that it
matters a great deal how the Security Council goes about the
business of addressing international crimes.  In particular, the
Council may prove most effective if it avoids conceiving itself
as an administrator of top-down “one-size-fits-all” policy solu-
tions, but instead focuses on ensuring the accountability of the
processes by which affected societies address their own past
crimes.  By seeking to enhance the democratic legitimacy of
national policies, the Council can help ensure that national
policies exhibit greater legitimacy than those imposed by fiat.
And in cases where states refuse democratic solutions, the
Council’s endorsement of ICC action will rest on stronger
footing given the lack of a democratically legitimate alterna-
tive.
The focus on such process-based concerns pervades the
literature on transitional justice.  Guttmann and Thompson,
for example, observe that amnesties will have greater claim to
moral justification if they are the products of deliberative dem-
ocratic processes that rely on rationales accessible to (if not
necessarily accepted by) all stakeholders.240  Other commenta-
240. See Gutmann & Thompson supra note 99. R
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tors have highlighted similar concerns.241  It is also no coinci-
dence that the most celebrated amnesty deal, that imple-
mented by South Africa, is also the one reflecting the greatest
democratic legitimacy, with the mechanics of the TRC having
emerged from a public, national process characterized by re-
peated legislative hearings, study of lessons learned in past
transitional justice experiments, and engagement of a broad
array of stakeholders.242  Recall again Kofi Annan’s argument
that the ICC should defer to a South African-style solution that
reflects the assent of the “whole nation.”243  There is no reason
why a similar ideal (if never capable of full realization) should
not animate all discussion of transitional justice policies,
whether involving amnesties, truth commissions, exemplary
prosecutions, or Rwandan-style plea bargaining.
One can imagine, for example, that coordination between
individual states, the Security Council, and the ICC might take
the form of what Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel have
described as democratic experimentalism, encouraging a “di-
rectly deliberative” democracy through local experimentation,
stakeholder engagement, and information sharing.244  The
U.N. Security Council could seek to guarantee the integrity
and accountability of this process both through its own author-
ity and by relying on the oversight of actors such as the U.N.
Secretary General or relevant regional institutions.  Ultimately,
this type of arrangement could pave the way for a richer role
on the ICC’s part.  The Court would no longer define itself by
reference to a policy of limited, atomistic prosecution con-
ducted without regard to political context but could instead
link its operations to a broader effort of promoting societal
transformation.
Of course, this kind of process-based approach will re-
quire judgments based on the circumstances of individual
cases.  Although my distinction between pre-transitional and
transitional contexts may suggest a binary distinction, the real-
ity can be murkier.  For example, states in Latin America have
faced slow transitions in which moderate democratic govern-
241. See McDonald & Haveman, supra note 7; Slye, supra note 229, at 245. R
242. See BORAINE, supra note 96, at 47-75. R
243. Annan Press Release, supra note 112. R
244. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 290 (1998).
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ments are elected but entrenched military officials have pre-
vented accountability measures that otherwise might have
been possible.245  In divided societies that have experienced
persecution of ethnic minorities, or in international conflicts
where citizens of one state cross borders to commit crimes in
another, the majoritarian democracy of any particular state
may be insufficient.246  But these complexities merely confirm
the desirability of engaging an external political actor such as
the Security Council to help reach accountable judgments
about acceptable compromises and about the breadth and
type of stakeholder engagement required.
2. Constructive Deference
Another approach is for the Prosecutor to refrain from
actual cooperation with political actors but to adopt policies
designed to afford maximum flexibility to those actors.  The
Prosecutor could do this by adopting the same policy in the
transitional context as I have proposed for the pre-transitional
context.  By acting only in the case of the most serious atroci-
ties, and by selecting only egregious offenders occupying the
highest levels of authority, the Prosecutor may hope to target
those few suspects who are least likely to be spared prosecution
under any sound transitional justice regime.  This rationale
provides a framework for understanding the ICC Prosecutor’s
current policy:  The best justification for leaving unindicted
the vast majority of perpetrators is not resource constraints or
independent considerations of gravity, but rather the realiza-
tion that the so-called “impunity gap” reflects deep policy di-
lemmas that are beyond the competence of the Prosecutor to
resolve.  A policy of highly selective prosecution reflects a con-
structive deference to political bodies to address these issues.
The primary appeal of this approach is prosecutorial au-
tonomy:  It allows the Prosecutor to delegate policy questions
to political bodies without making the ICC’s actual decision-
making dependent upon political authorization.  But as the
2006 standstill in Uganda reflects, this form of prosecutorial
245. I have discussed above the example of Argentina. See supra notes 130-
133 and accompanying text.
246. Indeed, a similar complexity applies any time victims may be concen-
trated in a discrete class with perceived interests that differ from those of the
majority.
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minimalism is insufficient to avoid political friction when blan-
ket amnesty or something like it is on the table.247  Implicitly,
therefore, the constructive deference approach rests upon a
prediction that this strategy will correspond to good transi-
tional justice policy in any given situation.  In other words, the
expectation (not unreasonable) is that the prosecution of a
handful of the worst offenders will prove desirable for most
transitional societies irrespective of other contingent consider-
ations that may lead different societies to adopt different poli-
cies with respect to the majority of wrongdoers.  If that expec-
tation proves unwarranted—if, for example, it turns out that
blanket amnesties are desirable in many cases—then the strat-
egy of constructive deference will fail to remedy the legitimacy
problem of the ICC.
In most situations, however, it is more likely that such
minimalism will be insufficient:  The ICC’s efforts, however
constructive, are no substitute for a deeper reckoning under-
taken by transitional societies.  And here there may be some
risk that the international community will ignore this point,
and look to the ICC’s efforts for a comprehensive justice pol-
icy, rather than as one piece of a larger puzzle.  For example,
Croatia’s accession to the European Union was recently
delayed by the country’s failure to surrender an indicted gen-
eral to the ICTY.248  But this pressure to comply with individ-
ual indictments issued from The Hague does not seem to be
matched by any broader concern about Croatia’s general fail-
ure to pursue any form of accountability or public reckoning
for the vast majority of its war criminals.
For these reasons, constructive deference may work best
as a complementary strategy to explicit deference rather than
as an alternate and independent approach:  The Prosecutor
could follow the minimalist path as a default, while simultane-
ously seeking advice and legitimation from the Security Coun-
cil as to whether this approach should be expanded or con-
tracted.249  The hope is that such guidance would typically be
247. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text. R
248. Renwick Mclean & Marlise Simons, Croatian Suspect In War Crimes Is
Arrested In Canary Isles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A3.
249. Although it remains to be seen what relationship may develop be-
tween the ICC and the Security Council, some have already anticipated that
the Prosecutor is in fact likely to heed the Council’s advice when it chooses
to provide it. See Brubacher, supra note 204, at 83 (“For reasons of public R
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forthcoming, and that constructive deference would therefore
be the exception rather than the rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article has been broadly two-fold:  first, to
provide an account of the International Criminal Court, which
complicates the standard belief that prosecutorial decision-
making must flow from legal principles unmarred by political
considerations or interference; and second, to consider and
suggest ways in which the ICC Prosecutor may, within the stat-
utory structure and spirit of the existing Court, moderate the
resulting legitimacy crisis by externalizing some of the most
difficult and unresolved questions of prosecutorial choice to
political actors who may claim greater comparative legitimacy.
I do not suggest or expect that a deferential policy along the
lines I have outlined can ever convert the ICC into a perfect
institution that neither requires controversial prosecutorial
judgments nor provokes detractors from both inside and
outside the societies whose lives the ICC will most affect.  I do
believe, however, that this approach has the potential, if imple-
mented, to create a partial bridge between the institution’s
supporters and opponents, which may set the stage for a more
stable and productive Court.
For those who insist upon an independent Prosecutor as a
bulwark against political weakness and realpolitik, my ap-
proach preserves the Prosecutor’s critical ability to employ in-
vestigations and indictments that call to account both interna-
tional criminals and the international community in times
when crimes are ongoing and unaddressed.  The hope—in-
deed arguably the greatest hope to which the ICC may as-
pire—is that this function will affect states’ behavior in ways
that take the demands of international justice more seriously.
At the same time, however, my approach recognizes that
prosecutorial policies are ultimately dependent, in part, upon
legitimate political questions that favor both a restrained ap-
proach to international indictment policy and a consideration
of the dilemmas faced by societies attempting to undertake
transitions to a more just order.  By seeking guidance from ap-
policy and in order not to obfuscate the role of the Security Council, the
Prosecutor will likely follow political determinations made by the Security
Council.”).
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propriate political actors in these circumstances, the ICC Pros-
ecutor may actually protect the Court’s institutional integrity
by outsourcing those policy questions which pose the greatest
challenge to the ambition of prosecutorial impartiality.  One
hopes that political actors, and in particular the U.N. Security
Council, will act wisely and with a proper respect for human
rights and justice.  But even if that is not the case, there re-
mains a logic to placing the policy dilemmas of transitional
justice in the political arena where they belong, where they
can be considered as such, and where they can be subject to
public debate and scrutiny.  This result, in my view, is prefera-
ble to an approach which effectively seeks to stifle public de-
bate by hiding policy dilemmas behind a shroud of legality
and impartial rules.
Of course, even this model will not satisfy those who be-
lieve that the mere potential for an irresponsible Prosecutor
supplies a sufficient basis to oppose the ICC.250  Prosecutorial
policies adopted without amendment of the Rome Statute can-
not legally constrain the full reach of the Prosecutor’s author-
ity.  But over time, such policies may gain acceptance among
the parties to the Statute and come to define the criteria ac-
cording to which future Prosecutors are selected by the Assem-
bly of States Parties.  In any event, I am inclined to agree with
those critics who view the threat of prosecutorial overreaching
as more of a danger to the integrity and success of the ICC
than to the interests of the world’s greatest powers.251  For a
nation like the United States that has expressed concerns
about the direction the Court might take, a policy of political
deference may provide a principled and situation-specific basis
for its criticism, allowing it to support the Court when working
well, but to withdraw cooperation and support in instances in
250. See, e.g,. Casey et al., supra note 8, at 20 (“It remains to be seen
whether the Prosecutor and the judges of the ICC will push the limits of
their discretion to interpret their power and authority as broadly as possible
and second-guess the exercise of the primary jurisdiction by States.  Rather,
the point is that the Rome Statute allows them to do so, and due to the lack
of built-in oversight and accountability of the Prosecutor and the judges, it
will be very hard, if not impossible, to stop them if they are so inclined.”).
Nor, of course, can my approach satisfy those who believe that international
institutions are inherently suspect and can be entrusted with matters such as
criminal enforcement.
251. See Goldstone, supra note 94.
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which the institution has trespassed the principles that have
facilitated such cooperation.
Such support will be especially critical in times when
there is broad acceptance of the need for international crimi-
nal prosecution but disagreement over the mechanism.  That
was the case, for example, when the United States recently
agreed to let the U.N. Security Council refer the Darfur situa-
tion to the ICC.  It would be both ironic and unfortunate if, as
happened in that case, a decision to pursue international pros-
ecution must be preceded, and possibly even scuttled, by pre-
liminary debates about the Court’s legitimacy that have noth-
ing to do with the instance at hand.252  A policy of political
deference may help that general institutional debate to recede
into the background, and may focus the world’s efforts on the
deeper project of international justice, and the political com-
mitments which that project requires.
252. See Warren Hoge, U.N. Votes to Send Any Sudan War Crimes Suspects to
the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A6.
